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The Mormon cases present a fascinating study of diversity and 
conformity in the nineteenth century United States. From their be­
ginning the Mormons were a gathered people. Almost immediately, 
from the time of their origin in New York, the Mormons challenged 
national and state legal systems to protect or at least tolerate their 
idiosyncracies. Mormon belief and practice came to include commu­
nal economics, theocratic government, and most challenging and of­
fensive of all to the larger national community, a radically different 
marital and social practice—polygamous marriage.
Mormon history began in New York and continued briefly in 
Ohio where Mormons first gathered. Mormons experienced their 
most savage suppression in Missouri, where the Governor, Lilbum 
Boggs, issued an extermination order and where the “Mormon war” 
saw Mormons driven into Illinois to seek refuge and a new commu­
nity. Illinois initially welcomed Mormon refugees, but the abrasive­
ness of a people who were so incapable of assimilation into the 
existing society again led to conflict resulting in the murder of the 
founder of Mormonism, Joseph Smith and his brother Hyrum. The 
Mormon exodus to the Great Basin of the American West followed, 
under the direction of Brigham Young, one of this nation’s leading 
colonizers.
After they migrated to the deserts of the Great Basin, the Saints1 
pursued their radical theory of Zion as an alternative to the social
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experiment of pluralistic America. A critical part of this effort was 
the establishment and maintenance of their own court system. 
Through their ecclesiastical courts, Mormons were able to offer an 
alternative to the divisive influence of the adversarial legal system 
with its technical pleadings, rules of evidence, and pettifogging law­
yers. More importantly, Mormons were able to interject their own 
notions of community and temporal affairs into the resolution of so­
cial conflict. The ecclesiastical court system facilitated radical 
changes in the laws governing the distribution of land, water, and 
other natural resources. Church courts also permitted religious per­
spectives to be determinative in conflicts arising out of contractual or 
tortious disputes. Finally, the courts provided forums for the media­
tion of conflicts in polygamous families. In each of these substantive 
law areas, the existence of the Church courts enhanced the indepen­
dence of the church from the state, thereby lending credibility to the 
theological concept of Zion.
I. The N ineteenth-Century Climate
Nineteenth-century frontier America was a radically different 
place from the world we know today. Many Americans, and Ameri­
can courts for that matter, thought that Americans shared a common 
understanding of God and religion.2 While professing a belief in the 
free exercise of religion, many courts “assumed that America was a 
Christian country, and more particularly, a Protestant Christian 
country.”3 In 1854, for example, the Supreme Court of Maine upheld 
a decision to expel an Irish Catholic child from school for refusing to 
participate in a Protestant religious exercise.4 In 1811, the highest 
state court in New York upheld an indictment for blasphemy and 
stated that, “[W]e are a Christian people, and the morality of the 
country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity.”5 Sunday closing laws
2 See, e.g., North v. Board of Trustees, 137 111. 296, 305, 27 N.E. 54, 59 (1891) (University 
of Illinois did not violate state constitution in requiring daily chapel exercises because nothing 
prevents state colleges from adopting “all reasonable regulations for the inculcation of moral 
and religious principles in those attending them/*).
3 See Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 
Emory L.J. 777, 783 (1986); W. Torpey, Judicial Doctrines of Religious Rights in America 16 
(1948); see also Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 (1876) (150 Catholic students expelled by Protes­
tant school board and not readmitted until they vowed that they would not miss school for 
Catholic religious ceremonies again). But see State ex rel. Weiss v. District School Bd., 
44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890) (Bible readings in state schools banned as violative of state’s 
constitution).
4 See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854).
5 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. 1811). For other cases and discussions of 
early blasphemy prosecutions, see L. Levy, Blasphemy in Massachusetts (1973); Zeisweiss v. 
James, 63 Pa. 465 (1870); Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206 (Mass. 1838); State v.
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were also regularly upheld by a majority of state courts6 and by the 
United States Supreme Court.7
This Christian nation attitude permeated the judiciary and sus­
tained the religious views of the majority. In 1843, Justice Joseph 
Story, for example, in the famous case of Vidal v. Girard's Executors,8 
went as far as to assert that Christianity was part of the common law 
of the United States.9 Similarly, after compiling a long list of histori­
cal antecedents, in 1882 Justice David Brewer, in the case of Holy 
Trinity Church v. United S tates10 declared, “[T]his is a Christian na­
tion.”11 Thus, the early Mormon Church had to contend not only 
with a judiciary comfortable with intruding into the most sensitive 
aspects of church-state relations, but also with a body of law shaped 
by the popular sentiment of America’s Christian attitude. The result 
was a judiciary with both the power and the impetus to resolve legal 
disputes within the sphere of majoritarian religious values.
For Latter-day Saints in the nineteenth century, the civil courts, 
lawyers, and the law represented an inadequate and frequently cor­
rupt system that worked against the establishment of Zion. For non­
Mormons, such peculiar Mormon practices as polygamy and commu­
nal economic practices were so threatening to the larger community 
that suspending the normal operation of the law seemed justified. 
Mobs, frequently headed by respectable members of their communi­
ties, often law enforcement officials acting outside of the law, forcibly 
expelled Mormons from legally purchased homes and lands. The fed­
eral government restructured the concepts of due process and reli­
gious freedom to compel Mormon conformity with the larger 
community, the best known example being the government’s attack 
on polygamy. Prior to the judicial attack on polygamy, however, the 
Mormons endured several decades of litigation in New York, Ohio, 
Missouri, and Illinois. This early persecution undoubtedly fueled the 
Saints’ later desire to establish an ecclesiastical court system apart
Chandler, 2 Harr. 553 (Del. 1838); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 
1824); Delaware v. Chandler, 3 Harr. 553 (Del. 1837); W. Torpey, supra note 3, at 58-60.
6 See, e.g., Elden v. People, 161 111. 296, 43 N.E. 1108 (1896); Lindenmuller v. People, 33 
Barb. 548 (N.Y. 1861); Missouri v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214 (1854); Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 
312 (1848); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817). But see State v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 15 W. Va. 362 (1879).
7 See, e.g., Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896); Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 
118 (1891); Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S. 555 (1888); Gibbs & Sterret Mfg. Co. v. 
Brucker, 111 U.S. 597 (1884); Pence v. Langdon, 99 U.S. 578 (1878).
8 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
9 Id. at 198.
10 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
n  Id. at 471.
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from the corrupt influences of the secular world. The persecution 
that ultimately turned the Saints against the gentile law began in New 
York.
The earliest trials involving Joseph Smith occurred in New York 
in 1826 and 1830. In each instance, Smith was charged with vagrancy 
in connection with his money-digging activities.12 Although appar­
ently he was acquitted,13 to avoid further harassment Smith left New 
York and fled to Ohio in February 1831.14 The litigation continued in 
Ohio. Unlike the New York experience, however, the Ohio litigation 
did not stem from the Mormons’ belief in the “Golden Bible,”15 but 
rather from a self-inflicted commercial disaster—the failure of the 
Kirtland Safety Society.
When Ohio failed to grant the Kirtland Safety Society a state 
banking charter, the Saints issued their own notes to pay for large 
quantities of merchandise that had been purchased on credit.16 
Within six months of the Safety Society’s formation, however, the fi­
nancial panic of 1837 swept the nation, taking down the Society along 
with thousands of other over-subscribed banks.17 The Society episode 
embarrassed Joseph Smith and cost him many of his closest support­
ers. But with the exodus of 1838, Church leadership and the majority 
of the Saints left financial disaster in Ohio only to face state supported 
militant hostilities in Missouri.
Early Mormons regarded Missouri, specifically Jackson County, 
as the divinely revealed site for the establishment of Zion.18 Soon af­
ter the first Mormons arrived at Independence, Missouri on January 
13, 1831, however, a “secret constitution” was entered into in July 
1833 by many of the prominent men of the county.19 On July 20, 
1833, the pledgees of the “secret constitution” gathered at the court­
house in Independence to ask the Mormons to leave Jackson
12 See Walters, Joseph Smith's Bainbridge, New York, Court Trials, 36 Westminster Theo­
logical J. 123, 129 (1974).
13 See R. Bushman, Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism 162 (1984); 1 J. 
Smith, History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 96 (rev. ed. 1978).
14 See 1 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 39-45; 1 B. Roberts, Comprehensive History of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 240-41 (1965).
15 See M. Parkin, Conflict in Kirtland: A Study of the Nature and Causes of External and 
Internal Conflict of the Mormons in Ohio Between 1830 and 1838, 263-73 (M.A. thesis, Brig­
ham Young University 1966).
16 See Hanson, Money of the Mountains, 64 Improvement Era 158, 158-59 (1961).
17 See 1 B. Roberts, supra note 14, at 402; Hill, Rooker & Wimmer, The Kirtland Econ­
omy Revisited: A Market Critique of Sectarian Economics, in 3 Stud, in Mormon Hist. 81 
(1977).
18 See Doctrine & Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 57:3 (1835) 
[hereinafter Doctrine & Covenants].
19 See 1 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 374-76.
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County.20 The Mormons, however, declined to leave their appointed 
place of gathering, and violence soon followed.
As the violence escalated, the Mormons sought relief from Mis­
souri Governor Daniel Dunklin on September 28, asking for military 
protection so that they might defend their rights by suing for their 
loss of property.21 The governor, in a response dated October 19, 
1833, advised the Mormons to file civil actions before the local circuit 
judges and justices of the peace.22 The local magistrates, however, 
refused to punish the mob leaders who had demolished and destroyed 
Mormons’ houses and stores, and the violence continued. Finally, af­
ter the Mormons had been driven from their homes and forced to 
escape across the Missouri River on November 7,23 a petition contain­
ing 114 signatures was sent to President Andrew Jackson.24 The peti­
tion asked that federal troops restore the Saints to their homes and 
thereafter maintain peace until civil order could be restored. Presi­
dent Jackson’s formal reply, however, stated that he had no authority 
to call out the military to enforce state laws.25
Thereafter, many of the Mormons who fled Jackson County set­
tled in Caldwell County, Missouri. Although the Saints anticipated 
peace in their new settlement, the rapid influx of Mormons again agi­
tated the local settlers to violence.26 This time, however, as the 
number of assaults on Mormons increased, the Saints began to fight 
back.27 When reports reached Governor Lilbum Boggs that the 
Mormons were arming themselves and committing acts of violence, 
he issued his now infamous order of extermination.28 Three days af­
ter this order was given, on October 30, 1838, eighteen or nineteen 
Mormons, including children, were massacred at Haun’s Mill in 
Caldwell County.29 The following day a mob, led by state militia, 
surrounded the Mormons gathered at Far West in Caldwell County, 
and arrested and imprisoned their leaders.30 Under these ominous 
circumstances and without many of their leaders, the Mormons re­
treated to Quincy, Illinois.
20 Id. at 395-99.
Id. at 410-15.
22 Id. at 423-24.
23 Id. at 437.
24 Id. at 483-85.
25 Id. at 493.
26 See 3 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 57.
27 See B. Roberts, The Missouri Persecutions 214-15 (1900).
28 The order of extermination directed the state militia to treat the Mormons as enemies 
who “must be exterminated or driven from the state.” 3 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 175.
29 Id. at 183-86, 212.
30 id. at 192.
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When Church leaders later arrived in Illinois in the spring of 
1839, they realized the futility of efforts to secure redress from either 
the courts or legislature for the property and lives lost in Missouri. 
The Church leadership, therefore, began looking elsewhere for money 
and protection. The Mormons’ first plan of attack was to have the 
governor of each state petition Congress to impeach the State of Mis­
souri for not guaranteeing a republican form of government.31 A 
group of the Church leaders left for Washington in November 1839 
with a petition claiming redress from the national government.32 The 
day after their arrival, they were introduced to President Van Buren, 
who frankly stated that although their cause was just, he could do 
nothing for them because he would “come in contact with the whole 
state of Missouri.”33 The “Mormon problem” perplexed the con­
gressmen whom the Saints next petitioned. Although the Senate Judi­
ciary Committee debated the Mormons’ petition,34 the question of the 
Senate’s jurisdiction, and the political undesirability of siding with the 
Mormons resulted in an unfavorable disposition by the committee.35
The disheartening Missouri episode led the Mormons to con­
clude that the political branches of the federal government, as well as 
each branch of the Missouri state government, were incapable, incom­
petent, or at least disinclined to offer either protection or redress. As 
a result, the Mormons turned inward, forging a new society in 
Nauvoo, Illinois that combined democratic and theocratic elements of 
government to provide for substantial autonomy, insularity, and self­
sufficiency.
With Nauvoo’s government in place, Joseph Smith and the 
Nauvoo City Council attempted to insulate themselves from what the 
Mormons saw as continuing harassment through vexatious lawsuits.36 
To accomplish these ends, the council passed numerous ordinances 
increasingly expanding its power. Eventually, these ordinances gave 
the council a virtual carte blanche to declare any writ issued by any 
other court valid or invalid, and if necessary, examine the merits of 
the case.37
The greatest abuse of the council’s power, however, occurred
31 Id. at 310-11.
32 See 4 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 24-38.
33 Id. at 40; 5 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 393; 6 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 203.
34 See 57 Niles Nat’l Register 398 (1840) (LDS Church Archives); Cong. Globe, 26th 
Cong. 1st Sess., at 185 (1840).
35 Id.
36 See Kimball, A Wall to Defend Zion: The Nauvoo Charter, 15 B.Y.U. Stud. 491, 496 
(1975).
37 See 5 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 185-92; Oaks, The Suppression of the Nauvoo Exposi­
tor, 9 Utah L. Rev. 862, 880 n.l 16 (1965).
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with the destruction of the Nauvoo Expositor. During the Spring of 
1844, a group of influential Nauvoo citizens became disaffected from 
the Church and particularly from its prophet.38 Alarmed that Joseph 
Smith had cloaked himself with both religious and temporal power, 
the group published a newspaper on June 7, 1844, containing bristling 
editorials about the integrity and morality of Nauvoo’s leaders.39 The 
Nauvoo City Council met the following day and passed an ordinance 
declaring the paper a public nuisance and ordering its destruction.40 
The destruction of the Nauvoo Expositor was more than the citizens 
could bear. The threat of the “Mormon Kingdom” under the cover 
of the Nauvoo Charter led to the murders of Joseph and Hyrum 
Smith before the month was out, and ultimately to the Mormon mi­
gration to the Great Basin.41
II. The Judicial Campaign Against Polygamy
The Mormons moved to the Great Basin desert to find the auton­
omy that would allow them to build Zion unimpeded by religious per­
secution. The choice of a largely uninhabited desert as the center 
place for the kingdom was motivated primarily by the Saints’ desire to 
be left alone to freely establish a distinctive way of life that other com­
munities had found so threatening and offensive. Instead, they now 
had to deal with the federal government, initially cautious and soon 
hostile and bent on eradicating Mormon distinctiveness.
A. Early Judicial Attacks on Polygamy
Officially acknowledged as part of Latter-Day Saints Church 
doctrine in 1852, polygamy soon became a national issue. Congress’s 
first attempt to deal with polygamy was the Morrill Act.42 It was not 
passed until 1862, ten years after the Church first announced its prac­
tice of polygamy, and then went largely unenforced for the next thir­
teen years.
Because of various defects in the statute, however, the first at­
tempts to prosecute polygamists were not brought under the Morrill 
Act. In 1871 Thomas Hawkins was indicted for and convicted of 
having adulterous relations with his polygamous wife.43 Indictments
38 See 6 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 344-51, 405, 412-13.
39 See L. Newell & V. Avery, Mormon Enigma: Emma Hale Smith 181 (1984).
40 See 6 J. Smith, supra note 13, at 448.
41 See L, Arrington & D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience 65-82 (1979).
42 Morrill Act, ch. 126, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 501-02 (1862).
43 See Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 Utah L. Rev. 308, 330 
(1964).
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immediately followed against a number of leading Church officials 
(including Brigham Young) under a Utah statute prohibiting lewd 
and lascivious cohabitation.44 By indicting the Church’s leading 
figures, the government sought to set a vivid example for rank and file 
members, paralyze the Church’s leadership, and cow the Mormon 
populace into submission to federal policy.
The government’s plan, however, was not to be realized. In Clin­
ton v. Englebrecht,45 the United States Supreme Court ruled that in 
his efforts to purge juries of Mormons and secure the conviction of 
polygamists, Judge McKean, a rabid anti-Mormon, had improperly 
ignored Utah’s jury selection procedures. As a result, Hawkins’s con­
viction for adultery was overturned, and the indictments against 
Young and the others were dismissed.46 The prosecution of polygamy 
thus was halted until 1875 and the Reynolds case.
B. The Reynolds Decision
George Reynolds was an English immigrant, private secretary to 
Brigham Young, and a polygamist.47 In October 1874, he was in­
dicted under the Morrill Act,48 and subsequently convicted of polyg­
amy on the testimony of his polygamous wife. On appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court, Reynolds argued that the grand jury that had in­
dicted him had been constituted improperly.49 The Utah Supreme 
Court agreed and reversed Reynolds’s conviction because the trial 
court followed federal rather than territorial law in fixing the size of 
the grand jury.50
In October 1875, Reynolds was indicted again for violating the 
Morrill Act. This time, in accordance with Utah law, the indictment 
was handed down by a grand jury of fifteen men, seven Mormons and 
eight non-Mormons.51 Reynolds was convicted again and sentenced 
to two years’ hard labor and a $500 fine. The Utah Supreme Court 
sustained his conviction.52
With but one avenue of appeal remaining, Reynolds turned to 
the United States Supreme Court.53 The Court affirmed the territorial
44 See 5 B. Roberts, supra note 14, at 395 (1965).
*5 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434 (1871).
46 See Linford, supra note 43, at 331.
47 See Davis, Plural Marriage and Religious Freedom: The Impact of Reynolds v. United 
States, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 287, 287-88 (1973).
48 See 5 B. Roberts, supra note 14, at 469.
49 United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 226 (1875).
so Id.
51 See Linford, supra note 43, at 333.
52 United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 319 (1876), aff’d, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
53 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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court’s rejection of Reynolds’s challenges to the grand jury’s size, im­
proprieties in jury selection, and prejudicial jury instruction. But the 
bulk of the Court’s opinion was devoted to Reynolds’s claim that the 
trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that a finding that 
Reynolds engaged in polygamy as a result of a sincere religious con­
viction would justify his acquittal.54 Reynolds argued that the first 
amendment’s guarantee of the free exercise of religion can excuse con­
duct that would otherwise be criminal.55 The Court’s analysis of that 
issue made Reynolds a landmark case.
The Court first attempted to define how the word religion fell 
within the ambit of the free exercise clause.56 Finding no guide to the 
definition of the term religion in the Constitution itself, the Court 
turned to the writings of Madison and Jefferson, sources contempo­
rary with the adoption of the first amendment. The Court quoted 
from Jefferson to the effect that “religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God; . . . the legislative powers of the govern­
ment reach actions only, and not opinions.”57 Adopting this demar­
cation, the Court concluded that “Congress was deprived of all 
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good 
order.”58
In arriving at the conclusion that “laws are made for the govern­
ment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices,”59 the Court grasped 
one-half of a profound dilemma posed by the first amendment’s pro­
tection of religion. The Court recognized that the first amendment 
could not be read so broadly that any conduct asserted to be an exer­
cise of religion would be immune from state regulation.60 But the 
Court wrongly concluded that because not all religious conduct rea­
sonably could be exempted from civil control, no religious conduct 
was protected by the first amendment. By so concluding, the Court 
ignored the express terms of the Constitution which protect the “free
54 Id. at 150.
55 Id. at 161-68.
56 U.S. Const, amend. I.
57 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164; see also T. Jefferson, The Complete JefTerson 518-19 (S. Pado- 
ver ed. 1943).
58 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
59 id. at 166.
60 “To permit this,” the Court reasoned, “would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a 
law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.” Id. at 
167. To illustrate this point, the Court produced a parade of horrors, examples of religiously 
inspired conduct that no civilized society could abide, such as human sacrifice. Id. at 166.
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exercise” of religion.61 Moreover, the Court overlooked the other side 
of the first amendment dilemma. Religion is as much conduct as it is 
belief. The two cannot be disentangled. It is the religious practices of 
unpopular minorities that are most likely to be restricted by the state 
and thus are most in need of protection. The free speech clause of the 
first amendment fully protects the freedom of belief. Thus, unless the 
free exercise clause protects at least some practices that are offensive 
to the majority, that provision is devoid of any practical content. Yet 
the Reynolds decision forecloses such an application of the first 
amendment.
Having established the belief-conduct distinction and determined 
that the first amendment was no bar to outlawing religiously inspired 
conduct, the Court next concluded that polygamy was sufficiently 
“subversive of good order”62 to be formally criminalized. This second 
conclusion is also troublesome. As Linford notes, “[T]he Court never 
quite explained why plural marriage was a threat to the public well­
being.”63 No victim of Reynolds’s conduct was produced, it was con­
ceded that polygamous sects might be well ordered, and the Court 
never examined whether polygamy degraded women. Instead, the 
Court found subversion of the social order on the basis of an abstract 
syllogism that polygamy meant patriarchy, which meant despotism.64 
To avoid this amorphous social evil, the Court invaded the right to 
religious freedom and limited the right to marry, a core element of 
personhood. Nevertheless, Reynolds’s conviction was unanimously 
affirmed.65
C. The Prosecution o f  Cohabitation Under the Edmunds Act
Although the Reynolds decision was a saddening blow to the 
Mormons, the immediate impact of the decision was limited. Reyn­
61 In the face of this language, the Court’s attempt to define constitutionally protected 
religion as belief, as one constitutional scholar concludes, “is at best an oversimplification.” 
See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 184 (2d ed. 1988); see also Freeman, A Remon­
strance for Conscience, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 806, 826 (1958) (dismissing the freedom to believe- 
freedom to act dichotomy and arguing instead that the protection of “free exercise” necessarily 
protects religious action).
62 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
63 See Linford, supra note 43, at 341.
64 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
65 On a petition for rehearing, it was pointed out that Reynolds’s sentence to hard labor 
had been improper because the statute provided only for imprisonment. The Court, therefore, 
reversed the lower court’s judgment in this respect and remanded the case so that the district 
court could impose proper punishment. See Id. at 168-69. Reynolds was resentenced to two 
years in prison and was released five months early for good behavior. He was received as a 
“living martyr” and ultimately became a General Authority of the Church. See Davis, supra 
note 47, at 291 & n.24.
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olds established that Congress had the power to punish polygamy, but 
the Morrill Act was a cumbersome weapon with which to do so. The 
period in which the Mormons effectively would resist Washington’s 
mandate, however, was rapidly ending. By 1880, the tone of congres­
sional debate indicated that the government not only had the power to 
outlaw polygamy but also had the will to act. The peaceful machin­
ery of the state again was used to punish the practitioners of an un­
popular religious belief.
In 1882 Congress adopted the Edmunds Act, which gave federal 
officials an efficient weapon for the prosecution of polygamists.66 It 
created the new offense of unlawful cohabitation (relieving prosecu­
tors of the burden of proving polygamous marriages), allowed joinder 
of polygamy and cohabitation charges, and effectively eliminated all 
Mormons as jurors in polygamy cases. The new law proved an effec­
tive tool in the hands of the Church’s opponents. By 1893, after the 
Church had renounced polygamy and prosecutions had largely 
ceased, there had been 1004 convictions for unlawful cohabitation and 
thirty-one for polygamy.67 The number of polygamy and cohabita­
tion convictions, however, understates the impact of “the raid” on 
Mormon society. Not just any Mormon male was allowed to practice 
polygamy; only those who were morally worthy and financially able 
were permitted to take plural wives. Thus, by and large, the 
polygamists were also the Mormons’ leaders.68 The conviction and 
imprisonment of polygamists served to paralyze Mormon society by 
removing its leadership.
To simplify polygamy prosecution, the Edmunds Act provided 
that men who “cohabit with more than one woman” would be guilty 
of a misdemeanor.69 The Act, however, did not say what conduct 
constituted cohabitation, nor does the Congressional Record offer any 
evidence that Congress considered the question. The Mormons ar­
gued that the benchmark of “cohabitation” should be sexual inter­
course. The courts first confronted the issue of what constituted 
cohabitation in United States v. Cannon.10 Angus Cannon, president 
of the Salt Lake Stake, had married three wives prior to passage of the 
Edmunds Act.71 Two of these wives, Clara and Amanda, lived with
66 Edmunds Act, ch. 47, §§ 1-9, 22 Stat. 30-32 (1882) (amended 1887, repealed 1909).
67 See L. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom: An Economic History of the Latter-day Saints 
1830-1900, at 359 (1958).
68 During this period, no General Authority and few bishops, stake presidents, or their 
counselors were monogamists. See L. Arrington & D. Bitton, supra note 41, at 204.
69 Edmunds Act, ch. 47, § 3, 22 Stat. 30, 31.
7° 4 Utah 122, 7 P. 369, aff’d, 116 U.S. 55 (1885), vacated, 118 U.S. 355 (1886).
71 See Linford, supra note 43, at 351.
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him in separate quarters in the same home. The third lived in a house 
nearby.72
Cannon was indicted for cohabiting with Amanda and Clara af­
ter passage of the Edmunds Act. At trial, Cannon offered to prove 
that, after Congress had passed the Edmunds Act, he had told Clara, 
Amanda, and their families that he did not intend to violate the law, 
and thereafter “did not occupy the rooms or bed of or have any sexual 
intercourse with” Clara. Unfortunately he could not afford to provide 
a separate house for Clara and her family. The court excluded the 
evidence as irrelevant, and Cannon was convicted.73
Cannon appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.74 His main objec­
tions were that “all cohabitation which the laws deals [sic] with is 
sexual cohabitation,”75 of which he was innocent, and that his prof­
fered evidence was wrongly excluded. The court, however, rejected 
this interpretation of the Edmunds Act. It concluded that “cohabita­
tion” meant dwelling together and not sexual intercourse.76 The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision.77 Consequently, 
proving cohabitation became ridiculously easy for federal prosecutors. 
As one scholar concluded, “[to] be tried was, in effect, to be 
convicted.”78
As the pace of polygamy prosecutions accelerated, the thought 
occurred to some eager prosecutor that the cohabitation statute would 
be more fearsome if every defendant faced not one cohabitation 
charge but many. Such would be the case if each year, month, or day 
that a man cohabited illegally could be the basis of a separate offense. 
A judicial test of this theory was attempted in the case of Lorenzo 
Snow.79 Snow was charged with cohabitation in three separate indict­
ments, each one charging the same offense with the same women, but
72 See Cannon, 116 U.S. at 60-61, 65.
73 Id. at 71.
74 In May 1885, instructions came from the underground headquarters of the Church to 
defend every case “with all zeal and energy possible.’* See G. Larson, The “Americanization” 
of Utah for Statehood 133-34 (1971).
75 Cannon, 4 Utah 122, 141, 7 P. 369, 381,aff’d, 116 U.S. 55 (1885), vacated, 118 U.S. 355 
(1886).
76 Id. at 133, 7 P. at 374-76. A companion case to Cannon reaffirmed that evidence of 
sexual conduct was irrelevant. See United States v. Musser, 4 Utah 153, 156, 7 P. 389, 390 
(1885). Musser was a stronger case for a finding of no cohabitation because the defendant had 
established each of his wives in a separate house. In sustaining Musser’s conviction, the Utah 
court noted that one of Congress’s purposes in passing the Edmunds Act was to reach promi­
nent Church leaders who had escaped prosecution under the Morrill Act’s three-year statute of 
limitations. Id. at 157-58, 7 P. at 391.
77 116 U.S. 55 (1885), vacated, 118 U.S. 355 (1886).
78 Linford, supra note 43, at 348.
79 United States v. Snow, 4 Utah 280, 9 P. 501 (1886).
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  12 C a r d o z o  L.  R e v .  7 76  199 0  -  1991
1 9 9 1 ] T H E  M O R M O N  E X P E R I E N C E 1 1 1
for different years. In separate trials, Snow was convicted on each 
indictment and given the maximum sentence for each conviction.80 
Thus, by segregating the charges against Snow, the prosecution was 
able to triple his punishment. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
convictions.81 The United States Supreme Court dismissed Snow’s 
appeal on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to hear it, be­
cause Snow did not question the validity of the statute but its 
application.82
With the principle of segregation having been approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court and the possibility of further review seemingly 
precluded by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Snow, 
federal prosecutors swiftly began expanding their use of the segrega­
tion of offenses, testing how far the principle could be pushed. In 
United States v. Groesbeck,83 the prosecution cut in half the period of 
each offense, charging the defendant with two counts of cohabitation, 
one for each six-month period.84 Unlike the Snow case, the trials of 
the two charges were consolidated. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court sustained both of these innovations.85 The court dismissed the 
argument that a single trial of the defendant on both charges allowed 
the jury to improperly consider Groesbeck’s first conviction in deter­
mining his guilt on the second charge. The court noted that consoli­
dation of offenses into a single trial saved the state the burden and 
expense, and the defendant the harassment, of multiple litigation.86
Meanwhile, Lorenzo Snow had served his first six-month sen­
tence. He then applied to the United States Supreme Court for a writ 
of habeas corpus, claiming that his further detention was unlawful 
because the two remaining sentences were the result of an unlawful 
segregation of a single offense. As before, the government contended 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction, but this time the Court held that it 
had jurisdiction.87 Cohabitation, the Court stated, was “inherently a 
continuous offense, having duration; and not an offense consisting of
80 Id.
si Id. at 280, 295, 313, 9 P. at 501, 686, 697 (1886), appeal dismissed, 118 U.S. 346 (1886).
82 Snow v. United States, 118 U.S. 346 (1886). Realizing that it had already decided one 
other cohabitation case, Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885), the Court vacated its 
decision in that case as having been issued without jurisdiction. See Snow, 118 U.S. at 355. 
Other courts continued to cite Cannon as an authoritative interpretation of the Edmunds Act, 
even though it no longer was binding precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 6 Utah 120, 
126, 21 P. 463, 464 (1889); United States v. Kuntze, 2 Idaho 80, 21 P. 407 (1889); United 
States v. Peay, 5 Utah 263, 269 14 P. 342, 345 (1887).
83 4 Utah 487, 11 P. 542 (1886).
84 Id. at 492, il P. at 542.
85 Id. at 496, 11 P. at 544.
86 Id. at 494, 11 P. at 543.
87 In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285 (1887).
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an isolated act.”88
Even after In re Snow, the courts could still impose multiple pun­
ishments for what was in reality one offense. The Edmunds Act spe­
cifically allowed the combination of polygamy and cohabitation 
charges.89 Because the definitions of the offenses were different, a 
man could be convicted of marrying a polygamous wife and then con­
victed again for living with her.90 The Supreme Court set limits on 
the combination of different offenses in In re Nielsen.91 Nielsen was 
indicted for adultery and cohabitation. Both charges were directed at 
his conduct with his polygamous wife, Caroline. Nielsen pleaded 
guilty to the charge of cohabitation and was sentenced to three 
months’ imprisonment. When arraigned on the adultery charge, Niel­
sen claimed his conviction for cohabitation barred his further prose­
cution. After serving his sentence for cohabitation, Nielsen was tried 
and convicted for adultery and sentenced to an additional 125 days’ 
imprisonment.92 The United States Supreme Court granted Nielsen’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.93
The Court managed to arrive at a sensible result. It reasoned 
that proof that Nielsen and Caroline lived together as husband and 
wife carried with it the assumption of intercourse that was the essen­
tial element of the adultery charge. Thus, when Nielsen was con­
victed of cohabitation, he was convicted of all the elements of adultery 
and could not be convicted separately for that offense.94 In re Nielsen 
put an end to attempts to make the polygamy laws more savage by 
piling offenses together or fracturing a single act into many separate 
offenses.
D. Witnesses to Cohabitation
To convict Mormon men of polygamy offenses, certainly no 
more effective and knowledgeable witnesses could be found than their 
wives. Two obstacles, however, appeared to bar use of this pool of 
witnesses. First, most Mormon wives were unwilling to testify against 
their husbands. Second, even if they were willing to testify, at com­
88 Id. at 281.
89 See Edmunds Act, ch. 47, § 4, 22 Stat. 30, 31 (1882) (amended 1887, repealed 1909).
90 For example, in Clawson v. United States, 113 U.S. 143 (1885), the defendant was con­
victed of polygamy for marrying a second wife and sentenced to three-and-one-half years* 
imprisonment and a $500 fine. He also was convicted of cohabiting with that wife and sen­
tenced to six months and a $300 fine.
9* In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
92 Id.
«  Id. at 191.
94 Id. at 187.
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mon law a person could not testify against his or her spouse.95 These 
problems were first confronted in Miles v. United States,96 the only 
other Morrill Act case to reach the United States Supreme Court be­
sides Reynolds.
From the evidence at trial, it appeared that John Miles had mar­
ried three women on the same day. Because Miles was charged with 
bigamy under the Morrill Act, it was necessary to prove his marriages 
to the three women. Therein lay the difficulty, for the marriage cere­
mony was shrouded in secrecy. Miles’s wife, Caroline, however, was 
willing to testify against him. Miles conceded his marriage to Caro­
line but denied his marriage to his first wife. Caroline’s testimony was 
essential to the state’s case; but if Caroline was Miles’s lawful wife, 
under the common law rule, her testimony was inadmissible. But her 
testimony helped establish that at the time Miles married her he al­
ready had a lawful wife. And if Miles had a wife when he married 
Caroline, his marriage to her was invalid, and she was a competent 
witness. The trial court resolved this perplexing question by throwing 
the whole matter to the jury. Caroline was allowed to testify.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court rejected the trial 
court’s ingenious labor-saving device. The Court concluded that a de­
fendant’s witness-wife must be treated prima facie as his lawful wife.97 
The principle behind this ruling was the old rule that a witness that is 
“prima facie incompetent” cannot give evidence “to establish his 
competency, and at the same time prove the issue.”98 The Court 
reached this ruling with apparent regret, for in doing so it recognized 
that it was disabling almost all witnesses to polygamous unions. The 
Court, however, recommended two escapes from this predicament. 
First, eyewitnesses to a marriage were not necessary. Polygamous 
marriages could be proven like any other fact, by admissions of the 
defendant or by circumstantial evidence.99 Second, if under existing 
laws it was too difficult to prove polygamy, Congress could always 
change the law. Because it was based on the testimony of an incom­
petent witness, Miles’s conviction was reversed.100
Nearly seven years after the United States Supreme Court deci­
sion in Miles excluded the testimony of wives in polygamy trials, Con­
gress provided in the Edmunds-Tucker Act that a wife was a 
competent witness in polygamy, bigamy, and cohabitation trials and
95 Commonwealth v. Allen, 191 Ky. 624, 231 S.W. 41, 42 (1921).
96 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
97 Id. at 315.
98 Id. at 314.
99 Id. at 311.
*oo Id. at 315-16.
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  12 C a r d o z o  L.  R e v .  7 79  199 0  -  1991
7 8 0 C A R D O Z O  L A W  R E V I E W [ V o l .  1 2 :7 6 5
required that records be kept of weddings in the territories.101 These 
provisions still retained one restraint on spousal testimony, however; 
they provided that only a willing wife be allowed to testify.102 Utah’s 
judges did not always follow the law, however. A number of Mormon 
women were required to testify against their husbands or face con­
tempt charges. Judicial use of the contempt power in the polygamy 
cases thus presented many Mormon families with a cruel dilemma. If 
the wife called as a witness submitted and testified, her husband 
would almost surely be convicted and imprisoned. If she refused, her 
husband might escape conviction, but she would be imprisoned. Per­
haps the most egregious case of judicial conduct in this regard was 
that of Belle Harris.103 Mrs. Harris and her infant son ultimately 
spent three and one-half months in prison for her refusal to testify 
before a grand jury investigating polygamy charges against her 
husband.104
In retrospect, it is difficult to offer any explanation for this judi­
cial conduct toward Mormon wives other than a spirit of vindictive­
ness. Courts had reduced the quantum of evidence required to 
establish polygamy or cohabitation to such a low level that in almost 
any case ample alternate sources of proof must have been available. 
Utah’s courts could not have believed that they needed to compel 
Mormon women to testify in order to convict their polygamous 
husbands.
The legislative and judicial war on polygamy ultimately was suc­
cessful. The Church officially abandoned the practice in 1890.105 The 
war, however, was not without its casualties. The Court’s decision in 
Reynolds was a good example of “a situation where the social import 
of the issue outstrips the political and legal resources of the time.”106 
The Court’s overly restrictive view of the free exercise clause virtually 
read it out of the Constitution for over sixty years. The anti-polyg­
amy sentiment of the day reached beyond its historical context and 
changed the course and development of constitutional law.
III. The War Against Mormon Society
During the period of conflict between the Mormons and the fed­
eral government, Congress never actually passed a law depriving
101 35 Stat. 1148-50 (1909).
102 Id. at 636.
103 Id. See Ex parte Harris, 4 Utah 5, 5 P. 129 (1884).
Id.
105 See S. Sperry, Doctrine and Covenants Compendium 752-62 (1960).
106 Keller, Book Review, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1082, 1086 (1972) (referring to a different is­
sue—municipal railroad bonding).
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Mormons of their civil rights simply because they were Mormons, but 
as applied by hostile federal judges and officials, some laws came close 
to that result. Nevertheless, throughout the polygamy prosecutions, 
federal attempts to simplify and expedite the conviction of 
polygamists routinely denied Mormons many of their fundamental 
rights. Done under the guise of stamping out polygamy, the 
Mormons’ civil rights were abridged in five significant and specific 
respects: Mormons were denied the right to serve as jurors; Mormons 
were denied the right to hold elective and public offices; Mormons 
were denied their franchise; children of polygamous marriages were 
denied inheritance rights; and the immigration of Mormons into the 
United States was obstructed, and foreign-born Mormons were denied 
citizenship.
A. The Exclusion o f  Mormons as Jurors
In response to repeated calls by President Rutherford B. Hayes 
to withdraw the privileges of citizenship from Mormons in Utah,107 
Congress passed the Edmunds Act in 18 82.108 The Act broadly pro­
vided that past or present polygamists and those who believed in po­
lygamy could be excluded from jury duty.109 Potential jurors could 
be questioned further under oath regarding their polygamous activi­
ties or beliefs and could be rejected for failing to answer such ques­
tions.110 Supporters of the Act claimed, of course, that the measure 
was necessary to ensure the effective prosecution of polygamists.111 
As disabling as the law was, however, the Edmunds Act only ratified 
a position already adopted by the United States Supreme Court two 
years earlier in Miles v. United States.112
Convicted of polygamy under the Morrill Act, Miles argued on 
appeal that a large number of potential jurors had been excluded im­
properly because they had testified that they believed in polygamy. 
Miles argued that the examination of the proposed jurors showed that 
the court, in effect, had administered an unlawful religious test to ex­
clude all Mormons from the jury. In upholding the Utah court, how­
ever, the Supreme Court relied on an 1878 territorial statute that
107 See 7 J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789­
1897, at 559-60 (1896-1899).
»08 ch. 47, 22 Stat 30 (1882) (amended 1887, repealed 1909).
109 id.
no id. § 5.
111 See 7 J. Richardson, supra note 107, at 606; R. Dwyer, The Gentile Comes to Utah: A 
Study in Religious and Social Conflict 42-43 (1971).
H2 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
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provided that a juror could be disqualified for partiality.113 Although 
the Supreme Court upheld the procedure based on the Utah statute, it 
also noted that it would have reached the same result even without 
the statute because, under common law, a juror could be excluded for 
actual bias.114
Because the Supreme Court had upheld the exclusion of Mor­
mon jurors on the basis of Utah statute and common law principles, 
the provision of the Edmunds Act excluding Mormon jurors was pre­
dictably sustained in Clawson v. United States.115 Clawson was in­
dicted for cohabitation and polygamy by a grand jury from which 
Mormons had been excluded systematically.116 Although the Ed­
munds Act effectively excluded Mormons as “jurors” in polygamy 
cases, Clawson argued that this exclusion did not extend to grand 
juries.117 The Supreme Court, however, without considering the 
unique role of the grand jury in society, held that the term juror en­
compassed both grand and petit juries and that the Edmunds Act 
therefore must be read broadly to disable Mormons from service on 
any juries.118
B. The Exclusion o f  Mormons as Voters
While the Edmunds Act exclusion of the Mormons from polyg­
amy trial juries was rationally related to the federal government’s goal 
of eliminating polygamy, other “anti-polygamy” measures of that Act 
were aimed directly at Mormon political power. Another provision of 
the Edmunds Act denied polygamists the right to vote.119 To enforce 
this provision, Utah’s registration and election offices were declared 
vacant, and a five-man commission was appointed to oversee Utah 
elections.120 During its first year, the Utah Commission barred over 
12,000 Mormons from voting in Utah. This was nearly one-fourth of 
eligible Mormon voters, and far exceeded the number of polygamists 
in Utah.121
The Utah Commission’s exclusion of Mormon voters met an im­
mediate judicial challenge. In Murphy v. Ram sey,122 the United
"3 Id. at 305.
114 Id. at 310.
115 114 U.S. 477 (1885).
Id. at 480.
•I’ Id. at 483-84.
1,8 Id.
us Ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 31 (1882) (amended 1887, repealed 1909).
•20 Id. § 9, 22 Stat. 30, 32.
121 See J. Allen & G. Leonard, The Story of the Latter-day Saints 395 (1976).
122 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
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States Supreme Court rebuked the commission, but its decision had 
mixed results for the Mormons. The Court held that the powers of 
the Utah Commission were restricted to ensuring that elections in 
Utah were fairly and properly conducted, and that the commission 
had no further power to establish voter qualifications or to administer 
a voter’s oath. On the other hand, the Court held that because the 
commission was legally powerless to exclude voters, it was not legally 
liable for the acts of voting officials who wrongfully obeyed the com­
mission excluding the Mormons.123
On the substantive question of the scope of the Edmunds Act’s 
disenfranchisement of polygamists, the Murphy Court again ruled 
against the Mormons. Because the Act’s provisions extended to all 
cohabitants and polygamists, it barred those who became polygamists 
before the Act’s passage as well as those who did so after 1882.124 
Nor was the statute an ex post facto law. The Act applied only to 
those who continued to practice polygamy and not to those who had 
abandoned it.125 The Court did not question whether other constitu­
tional provisions, such as the first amendment, might impose some 
rational restrictions on Congress’s power to set voter qualifications.126
C. The Exclusion o f  Mormons From Public Office
To the extent that Mormons were excluded from the vote, they 
were also and quite logically excluded from all elective and other pub­
lic offices. The Edmunds Act, in creating the Utah Commission to 
oversee Utah’s elections, mandated that no election could take place 
without the commission’s supervision.127 Because the commission 
was unable to arrive in Utah in time, no election was possible in 
1882.128 So that elective offices would not stay vacant pending the 
next election, Congress hastily passed the Hoar Amendment allowing 
Utah’s governor to appoint officials to fill vacant elective offices until 
the next election.129
Some disagreement arose regarding the effect of the Hoar 
Amendment. The Mormons maintained that under Utah law, when 
an election was not held, incumbent officials simply retained their of­
fices. Thus the governor had no appointments to make, for no offices 
were vacant. Utah’s governor, Eli H. Murray, a gentile who was hos­
*23 Id. at 36-37.
124 Id. at 42.
125 Id. at 43.
>26 Id. at 45.
>27 See ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 31 (1887).
*28 Wenner v. Smith, 4 Utah 238, 9 P. 293 (Utah 1886).
129 22 Stat. 313 (1882).
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tile to the Mormons and frustrated by their political obstructionism, 
decided that in spite of contrary Utah law, the offices were vacant. In 
September and October of 1882, he appointed a total of 174 replace­
ments to public office, almost all gentiles.130
Mormons reacted angrily to this attempted ouster, and many re­
fused to surrender their offices. Others instituted actions to validate 
their claim that no offices had been vacated due to the failure to hold 
elections when scheduled. In an unreported case, Kimball v. Rich­
ards,13' the Utah Supreme Court held that the Hoar Amendment, in 
fact, had vacated Utah’s elective offices, despite the amendment’s fail­
ure to specifically state this. Despite this judicial setback, some Mor­
mon officials still refused to relinquish their offices. The 1886 case of 
Wenner v. Smith 132 illustrates this continuing resistance. Defendant 
Smith had been elected probate judge of Salt Lake County in 1880. 
By virtue of the Hoar Amendment, the governor considered Smith’s 
office to be vacant and appointed Uriah J. Wenner as his successor in 
September 1882 to serve for eight months. Smith, however, refused to 
turn over the office and continued to receive the fees and salary of the 
judgeship. Wenner sued to recover those sums.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that Wenner’s 
appointment was lawful.133 Moreover, because the Edmunds Act de­
clared polygamists unfit to hold public office and because Smith was a 
polygamist, the court concluded his judgeship had been vacated by 
the Edmunds Act without reference to the Hoar Amendment. Thus, 
Wenner had been wrongfully denied the office and was entitled to re­
cover the fees.134
D. The Laws o f  Inheritance
Under common law, illegitimate children, if recognized by the 
law at all, could inherit property only from their mothers.135 Utah’s 
territorial legislature reversed this common law rule and provided in 
1852 that “illegitimate children and their mothers inherit in like man­
ner from the father.”136 It is, of course, a rather fine question whether
130 See 6 B. Roberts, supra note 14, at 65-66.
131 See Wenner v. Smith, 4 Utah 238, 245, 9 P. 293, 297-98 (1886) (discussing Kimball v. 
Richards).
»32 Id.
133 Id. at 247, 9 P. at 296.
*34 Id.
135 See J. Ritchie, N. Alford & R. Effland, Cases and Materials on Decedents’ Estates and 
Trusts 71-72 (5th ed. 1977).
136 1876 Comp. Laws § 677, at 268. Utah’s present law, like that of many states, similarly 
provides that an illegitimate child may inherit from his father if he has been acknowledged by 
his father, if the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth,
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the children of polygamous Mormon marriages were illegitimate. 
Under common law and federal law after passage of the Morrill Act, 
polygamous marriages were unlawful, and the offspring of such un­
ions presumably were illegitimate. In Utah, when such marriages 
were recognized, the children were not illegitimate.
This state of affairs presented Congress with a problem. Clearly, 
it was the nation’s policy to forbid polygamy and crush institutions 
that supported and furthered the practice. Utah’s law allowing wives 
and children of a polygamous man to inherit in the same manner as 
heirs of a monogamous man arguably furthered the practice of polyg­
amy. On the other hand, to overturn Utah’s laws and prohibit the 
children of polygamous marriages from inheriting property was 
equally clearly a cruel punishment that would be levied primarily 
against innocent children. Sensibly, Congress simply left the issue 
alone in 1887.
The continued Mormon resistance to enforcement of the polyg­
amy laws, however, finally eroded Congress’s moderate attitude to­
ward children of polygamy. In the Edmunds-Tucker Act, Congress 
annulled the Utah statute by providing that no illegitimate children 
shall be entitled to inherit from their father.137 As might be expected, 
the legislation spawned litigation. The question of the status of polyg­
amous children first came before the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Chapman v. H andley138 in 1890. George Handley died intestate in 
1874, leaving an estate of $25,000, a surviving widow, and eight chil­
dren, four of them the offspring of a then deceased plural wife. These 
children of polygamy claimed an interest in Handley’s estate under 
the Utah statute allowing illegitimate children to inherit from their 
parents. Handley’s other children invoked the Morrill Act to block 
their claim. Their argument was that the Utah law violated public 
policy in general by supporting polygamy. More specifically, because 
Utah’s statute supported polygamy, the Morrill Act had expressly an­
nulled it.139
The court expressed no doubt that the statute “was intended to, 
and did tend to, support, maintain, and countenance polygamy.”140 
Although the court recognized that its conclusion punished the inno­
cent children of polygamy, it noted that “Congress has recognized the 
potency of denying illegitimate children the rights of legitimacy and
or if paternity has been otherwise satisfactorily established. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-109(b) 
(1988).
»37 See § 11, 24 Stat. 637 (1887).
138 7 Utah 49, 24 P. 673 (1890).
id. at 51-52, 24 P. at 674.
Id. at 55, 24 P. at 675.
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inheritance as a means of breaking up and discouraging polygamy in 
the acts of 1882 and 1887.”141
In 1891, the year after the decision in Chapman v. Handley, an­
other case involving the same issues and similar facts was brought 
before the United States Supreme Court. In Cope v. Cope,142 however, 
the Supreme Court arrived at a different conclusion: “Legislation for 
the protection of children bom in polygamy is not necessarily legisla­
tion favorable to polygamy. There is no inconsistency in shielding the 
one and in denouncing the other as a crime.”143 Utah’s act, rather 
than promoting polygamy, simply protected the children of polyg­
amy.144 Further, Utah’s statute was not implicitly annulled by the 
Morrill Act in 1862. Rather, all of Congress’s acts relating to illegiti­
mate children should be read together, and “the later acts should also 
be regarded as legislative interpretations of the prior ones.”145 In 
1882 Congress had explicitly legitimated the children of polygamous 
marriages, and not until 1887 did it specifically bar their inheritance 
rights. These later actions demonstrated that in 1862 Congress had 
not meant to annul the Utah statute allowing illegitimate children to 
inherit.146
After 1890, when the Mormon Church formally renounced plu­
ral marriage, Utah again adopted a statute entitling the children of 
polygamous marriages to inherit property. The legislature further 
provided that any heir who previously had been denied an inheritance 
on the basis of his polygamous lineage could petition the courts for a 
redistribution of the estate.147 On the strength of this provision and in 
the wake of the favorable ruling in Cope, the children of George Han­
dley’s polygamous marriage petitioned Utah’s courts to award them 
their rightful share of their father’s estate.
Apparently in a vengeful mood, Utah’s Supreme Court declined 
to redistribute the estate. Instead, the court struck down the statute. 
The court reasoned that the Utah Act reopened cases that had been 
resolved by the judiciary, thus second-guessing judicial judgment. 
Under the separation of powers, this interference with the judicial 
process was unconstitutional.148 Curiously, the court did not mention 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cope v. Cope as a basis
1*1 Id.
137 U.S. 682 (1891).
>43 Id. at 687.
144 Id. at 685-86.
<45 Id. at 688.
»4« Id. at 689.
147 See ch. 41, 1896 Utah Laws 128-29.
148 Cope, 137 U.S. at 689.
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fo r  its  re c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th is  case , even  th o u g h  th a t  dec is io n  in  effect 
o v e rru le d  th e  te r r i to r ia l  c o u r t ’s d ec is io n  in  H a n d le y .
T h e  c o u r t ’s a c tio n  w as a  b i t te r  b u t  so m e w h a t e m p ty  g estu re . B e­
c au se  th e  E d m u n d s  A c t  in  1882 leg itim a te d  c h ild re n  o f  p o ly g am o u s 
m arria g e s , th e  c o u r t ’s ru lin g  affec ted  o n ly  th e  e s ta tes  o f  th o se  
p o ly g am is ts  w h o  h a d  d ied  p r io r  to  p assag e  o f  th e  E d m u n d s  A c t.
E . I m m i g r a t i o n  L a w s
F o r  th e  M o rm o n s , U ta h  b ecam e  th e  p o in t f ro m  w h ic h  th ey  
w o u ld  c a r ry  th e  w o rd  o f  th e ir  gospel th ro u g h o u t  th e  w o rld  a n d  in  
w h ic h  M o rm o n  c o n v e rts  f ro m  a ro u n d  th e  w o rld  w o u ld  g a th e r . S p iri­
tu a lly , im m ig ra tio n  w as th e  g a th e r in g  o f  th e  S a in ts  in to  th e  M o rm o n  
c o m m u n ity . E co n o m ica lly , th e  im m ig ra n ts  b ro u g h t th e  sk ills  a n d  
h a n d s  n e e d ed  to  se ttle  th e  w ilderness.
W ith  ty p ic a l in itia tiv e , th e  M o rm o n s  o rg an iz ed  th e  im m ig ra tio n  
o f  la rg e  n u m b e rs  o f  c o n v e rts  th ro u g h  th e  P e rp e tu a l  E m ig ra tin g  F u n d  
C o m p a n y .149 T h is  c h u rc h -sp o n so re d  c o m p a n y  p ro v id e d  ag en ts  to  a r ­
ra n g e  th e  c o n v e rts ’ p assag e  f ro m  E u ro p e  to  th e  E a s t  C o a s t o f  
A m e ric a , a n d  f ro m  th e re  to  U ta h . I t  a lso  p a id  p assag e  fo r  th o se  to o  
p o o r  to  p a y  th e ir  o w n  w ay . B y 1870, th e  y e a r  a f te r  th e  tra n s c o n tin e n ­
ta l  r a i lro a d  w as  c o m p le te d , th e  P e rp e tu a l  E m ig ra tin g  F u n d  C o m p a n y  
h a d  h e lp e d  o v e r  51 ,000  M o rm o n  im m ig ra n ts  re a c h  U ta h .150
T h is  la rg e  sca le  flow  o f  new , fo re ig n  M o rm o n s  in to  U ta h  n a tu ­
ra lly  a la rm e d  th e  C h u rc h ’s enem ies, w h o  fea red  th a t  th e  fa ith  o f  th e  
c o n v e rts  w o u ld  rev ita lize  th e  C h u rc h ’s d o c tr in e s .151 T h e  p o in t w as 
m a d e  m o re  lu rid ly  b y  f ic tio n a lized  re p o r ts  th a t  th e  M o rm o n s  im ­
p o r te d  yo u n g , in n o c e n t g irls  to  b eco m e p o ly g am o u s w ives in  a  so rt  o f  
re lig io u s  s la v e ry .152 P re s id e n t U lysses S. G r a n t  reflec ted  o n  th is  view  
w h e n  h e  re c o m m e n d e d  to  C o n g ress  in  h is  a n n u a l m essage  o n  D e c e m ­
b e r  7, 1885 th a t  it “ d riv e  o u t  licensed  im m o ra lity , su c h  as p o ly g am y  
a n d  th e  im p o r ta tio n  o f  w o m en  fo r  illeg itim a te  p u rp o se s .” 153 C o n g ress  
a c te d , in  p a r t ,  o n  th is  ad v ice  w h en  it  a d o p te d  th e  E d m u n d s -T u c k e r  
A c t  in  1887. S ec tio n  15 o f  th a t  A c t  d isso lved  th e  P e rp e tu a l  E m ig ra t­
in g  F u n d  C o m p a n y  a n d  fo rb a d e  th e  te r r ito r ia l  leg is la tu re  f ro m  a c tin g
149 See L. Arrington & D. Bitton, supra note 41, at 97-108.
iso w. at 99.
15i An 1881 essay in Harper’s Magazine stated that Mormonism “is an institution so abso­
lutely un-American in all its requirements that it would die of its own infamies within twenty 
years, except for the yearly infusion of fresh serf blood from abroad.” See Mulder, Immigra­
tion and the “Mormon Question”: An International Episode, 9 W. Pol. Q. 416, 423-24 (1956).
>52 See Mulder, supra note 151, at 428.
153 7 J. Richardson, supra note 107, at 356.
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in  a n y  fash io n  to  e n c o u ra g e  im m ig ra tio n  in to  U ta h .154 In  1891 C o n ­
g ress  a d d e d  p o ly g am is ts  to  th e  lis t o f  c lasses ex c lu d ed  fro m  th e  c o u n ­
t r y .155 In  1895, P re s id e n t G ro v e r  C lev e lan d  re c o m m e n d e d  to  
C o n g ress  th a t  it p re v e n t th e  im m ig ra tio n  o f  M o rm o n s  in to  th e  
c o u n try .156
V. T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  E c c l e s ia s t ic a l  C o u r t  Sy s t e m  
in  t h e  U t a h  G r e a t  B a s in
T h e  M o rm o n  legal ex p e rien ce  suggests  th a t  a  su b c u ltu re ’s ju d i ­
c ia l sy stem s o ften  a rise  fro m  its  e fforts to  c re a te  a n d  m a in ta in  a  se p a ­
ra te  id en tity . T h e  M o rm o n  ecc lesias tica l c o u r t  sy stem  em erg ed  
d u r in g  th e  ea rly  y ea rs  o f  th e  C h u rc h ’s ex is tence  to  d e lin e a te  th e  
b o u n d a rie s  o f  w h a t i t  m e a n t to  be  M o rm o n . T h e  M o rm o n  c o u r t  sy s­
te m  d id  n o t h o ld  its e lf  o u t  to  C h u rc h  m em b e rs  s im p ly  as  a n  a lte rn a ­
tiv e  to  th e  c iv il system . In s te a d  it  ac tiv e ly  c o m p e ted  w ith  th e  c iv il 
sy stem  as  M o rm o n ism  tra n sc e n d e d  th e  p lac e  u su a lly  a c c o rd e d  re li­
g ion  a n d  b e c am e  a n  a ll-en co m p ass in g  soc ia l reg u la to r . C onverse ly , 
th e  M o rm o n  legal ex p erien ce  suggests  th a t  th e  g re a te r  th e  s ta te  in t r u ­
siveness, th e  g re a te r  th e  in su la r ity  o f  th e  re lig ion . T h e  m o re  th e  
S a in ts  su ffered  fro m  ab u se  o f  th e  federa l, s ta te  a n d  c o n s titu tio n a l sys­
tem s, th e  m o re  deve lo p ed  th e ir  ecc lesias tica l c o u r t  sy stem s becam e. 
F in a lly , as  p o litica l, e conom ic , a n d  soc ia l c irc u m sta n c e s  fo rced  th e  
L a tte r-d a y  S a in ts  to  a b a n d o n  th e ir  m o s t d is tin c tiv e  p rac tic e s , th e  in ­
v o lv em en t o f  C h u rc h  c o u rts  in  te m p o ra l m a tte rs  b ecam e  in c re as in g ly  
a n a c h ro n is tic . T h e  g ra d u a l a c ce p tan c e  o f  A m e ric a n  p o litica l p lu ra l­
ism  in  p lace  o f  th e  M o rm o n  c o n c e p t o f  Z io n  m a rk e d  th e  en d  o f  a n  e ra  
fo r  th e  M o rm o n  ecc lesias tica l c o u r t  system .
A . T h e  S t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  M o r m o n  E c c le s ia s t ic a l  C o u r t  S y s t e m
T h e  M o rm o n  c o u r t  system , w h ich  d eve loped  a lo n g  p r ie s th o o d  
lin e s ,157 p ro v id e d  an  in s titu tio n a l fo ru m  fo r  a u th o r ita tiv e ly  reso lv in g  
issues ra n g in g  fro m  p e tty  q u a rre ls  to  succession  crises. F o rm a liz a tio n  
o f  a n  e la b o ra te  c h u rc h  c o u r t  sy stem  in tro d u c e d  a  lega lis tic  o v e rlay  in  
a  ra p id ly  e x p a n d in g  re lig ious b o d y  p a ra d o x ica lly  k n o w n  fo r  its  a n ti-  
lega lis tic  se n tim en ts . T h e  c h u rc h  c o u rts  c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  s ta b ility  o f  
a  c h u rc h  o ften  u n d e r  siege fro m  o u ts id e  o p p o n e n ts  a n d  in side  
d issen te rs .
154 See Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, § 15, 24 Stat. 637 (1887).
155 See ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891); Mulder, supra note 151, at 427.
156 Id. at 362.
137 See J. Widstoe, Priesthood and Church Government 32-37 (1939); R. Cowan, Doctrine 
and Covenants: Our Modem Scripture 50-53 (1978).
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T h e  fo rm a l s tru c tu re  o f  th e  c h u rc h  c o u rts  rep lica ted , in  p a r t ,  th e  
ru le  o f  law  m o d e l o f  A m e ric a n  c o n s titu tio n a l d em o c rac y , w h ereb y  
ch e ck s  a n d  b a la n c e s  p re se rv ed  th e  U n io n  a g a in s t th e  exerc ise  o f  p re ­
ro g a tiv e  a n d  u n law fu l excesses. A s  lo n g  as th e  in s titu tio n s  genera lly , 
a n d  th e  m em b e rs  u ltim a te ly , rese rv ed  ch eck s  o v e r lead e rs , u n c o n ­
tro lle d  excesses o n  th e  p a r t  o f  th e  p r ie s th o o d  co u ld  b e  sa n c tio n ed  
w ith o u t u n d e rm in in g  th e  sa n c tity  o f  th e  c h u rc h . A c c o rd in g ly , th e  
c h u rc h  c o u r ts  w ere  o rg an iz ed  in  a  h ie ra rc h ic a l p ro g re ss io n  f ro m  tr ia l  
c o u r ts  to  c o u r ts  o f  final rev iew .
B asica lly  th e re  w ere  th re e  c o u rts  in  th e  M o rm o n  ecc lesias tica l 
c o u r t  system : th e  B ish o p ’s C o u r t , th e  H ig h  C o u n c il C o u r t , a n d  th e  
C o u r t  o f  th e  F ir s t  P re sid en cy . T h e  B ish o p ’s C o u r t  w as e s ta b lish e d  as 
th e  b asic  ecc lesias tica l fo ru m  in  th e  M o rm o n  ju d ic ia l  sy stem  o n  A u ­
g u s t 1, 1831.158 W h ile  “ [t]he  p ro ceed in g s  in  th e  B ish o p ’s C o u r t  h av e  
n ev e r b een  u n ifo rm  in  th e  c h u rc h ,” 159 g en e ra l n o rm s  o f  p ro c e d u re  
em e rg ed  o u t o f  th e  e a rly  c o u rts . W rit te n  c o m p la in ts , o f ten  a  m ere  
n o te  o n  a  s c ra p  o f  p a p e r, n o rm a lly  c o m m e n ce d  a n  a c tio n , a lth o u g h  
th e  c o u rts  a lso  rece iv ed  o ra l  c o m p la in ts . A n y  m em b e r a c q u a in te d  d i­
re c tly  o r  even  in d ire c tly  w ith  th e  offense c o u ld  file a  c o m p la in t, b u t  
te a c h e rs  p ro v id e d  specia l se rv ices as  c o m p la in in g  w itnesses. A f te r  re ­
ce iv ing  th e  c o m p la in t, th e  b ish o p  g en e ra lly  h a d  h is  c le rk  p re p a re  a n d  
d e liv e r a  su m m o n s , g iv ing  n o tic e  to  th e  p e rso n  a c cu se d  o f  th e  ch a rg e s  
a n d  th e  tim e  a p p o in te d  fo r  th e  h e a rin g .
T h e  b ish o p  a n d  h is  tw o  co u n se lo rs  p re s id e d  o v e r th e  tr ia l. T h e  
tr ia l  c o m m e n c e d  w ith  p ray e r , song , a n d  s c r ip tu re  rea d in g , fo llow ed  
b y  a n  e x h o rta tio n  to  th e  p a rtie s  to  re p e n t a n d  to  seek  fo rg iveness o r  
re c o n c ilia tio n . I f  th e  con flic t c o u ld  n o t  be  se ttle d  am icab ly , o r  th e  
p a rtie s  w ere  u n w illin g  to  fu lly  rep e n t, th e  tr ia l  c o m m en ced . T h e  p a r ­
ties  re p re se n te d  th em se lv es  th ro u g h o u t  th e  p ro ceed in g s; th e  absence  
o f  te c h n ic a l ru le s  o f  ev idence  o r  p lea d in g  a id e d  in  th e  ex c lu s io n  o f  
a tto rn e y s . A f te r  h e a rin g  th e  te s tim o n y  a n d  a n y  c lo sin g  re m a rk s , th e  
b ish o p  w o u ld  seek  th e  ad v ice  o f  h is  co u n se lo rs  b e fo re  re n d e r in g  a  
decision .
T h e  H ig h  C o u n c il C o u r t  a lso  e m erg ed  ea rly  in  th e  h is to ry  o f  th e  
C h u rc h  a n d  so o n  p ro v id e d  th e  c o u r t  sy s tem  w ith  a n  a p p e lla te  level o f  
rev iew  th a t  b e c am e  in c re as in g ly  n e c essa ry  i f  th e  S a in ts  w ere  to  re m a in  
un ified . L ik e  th e  B ish o p ’s C o u r t , th e  H ig h  C o u n c il C o u r t  c o n tin u e s  
to  th e  p re se n t in  c lo se  p ro x im ity  to  its  o r ig in a l fo rm . T h e  H ig h  C o u n ­
c il C o u r t  c o n s is ts  o f  a  s ta n d in g  b o d y  o f  tw elve  h ig h  p rie s ts  c a lled  h ig h
158 gee Doctrine & Covenants, supra note 18, 58:17.
159 J. Keeler, The Bishop’s Court, Its History and Proceedings, lecture delivered before the 
High Council of the Utah State of Zion 5 (1902).
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c o u n c ilo rs .160
H ig h  co u n c ils  w ere  m ad e  resp o n sib le  fo r  th e  “ se ttlin g  [of] im p o r­
t a n t  d ifficu lties w h ich  m ig h t a rise  in  th e  c h u rc h , w h ic h  c o u ld  n o t be 
se ttle d  by  th e  c h u rc h  o r  th e  b ish o p ’s c o u n c il to  th e  sa tis fa c tio n  o f  th e  
p a r tie s .” 161 T h u s  h ig h  co u n c ils  e n su re d  h ie ra rc h ic a l c o n tro l o f  loca l 
c h u rc h  c o u rts .
A f te r  th e  H ig h  C o u n c il C o u r t  rea c h e s  a  d ec ision , th e  c o u n c il 
su b m its  a  c o p y  o f  th e  p ro ce e d in g  to  th e  Q u o ru m  o f  th e  F ir s t  P re s i­
d en cy  o f  th e  C h u rc h , w h ich , a f te r  rev iew ing  th e  tra n s c r ip t, d ec id es  
th e  case  w ith o u t re g a rd  to  th e  p rev io u s  h ig h  c o u n c il d e c is io n .162 I f  
th e  F irs t  P re s id e n c y  h a s  b een  d isso lved  fo llow ing  th e  d e a th  o f  a  
p ro p h e t, a n  A p o s tle  C o u r t , m a d e  u p  o f  th e  Q u o ru m  o f  th e  T w elve , 
s its  as th e  final c o u r t  o f  ap p ea l. I f  b o th  th e  F ir s t  P re s id e n c y  a n d  th e  
Q u o ru m  o f  th e  T w elve  a re  n o t  in  ex istence , th e  F ir s t  Q u o ru m  o f  Sev­
e n ty  h a s  a u th o r i ty  to  a c t  a s  th e  final c o u r t  o f  a p p ea ls  fo r  th e  
C h u r c h .163
S c r ip tu re  p ro v id es  a  final a s su ra n c e  th a t  even  th ese  final c o u r ts  o f  
a p p e a l w ill n o t  m isuse  th e ir  a u th o r i ty  w ith  im p u n ity  b y  s ta tin g  th a t  i f  
a n y  o f  th e ir  dec is ions  a re  m a d e  “ in  u n rig h te o u sn e ss , it m ay  be 
b ro u g h t  b e fo re  a  g en e ra l a ssem b ly  o f  th e  severa l q u o ru m s , w h ic h  c o n ­
s ti tu te  th e  sp ir itu a l a u th o r itie s  o f  th e  c h u rc h ; o th e rw ise  th e re  c a n  be 
n o  a p p e a l f ro m  th e ir  d ec is io n .” 164 In  th is  d e m o c ra tiz in g  o f  c h u rc h  
c o u r t  p ro ceed in g s, s c r ip tu re  h a s  a ffirm ed  th e  u ltim a te  c o n tro l o f  th e  
m em b e rs  o v e r th e  C h u rc h .
T h e  P re s id in g  B ish o p ’s C o u r t , w h ic h  c o n sis ts  o f  th e  p re s id in g  
b ish o p  a ssis ted  by  tw elve  h ig h  p rie s ts  specifically  c h o sen  to  s it a s  a  
c o u rt, c o m p le te d  th e  ea rly  c h u rc h  c o u r t  sy stem . T h is  c o u r t  h a s  ex c lu ­
sive ju r is d ic tio n  to  t ry  m em b e rs  o f  th e  F ir s t  P re s id e n c y  i f  i t  sh o u ld  
b eco m e  necessary ; it w as ca lled  in to  session  to  e x c o m m u n ic a te  O liv e r 
C o w d e ry  a n d  S idney  R ig d o n .165
B. T h e  E x c lu s iv e  J u r is d ic t io n  o f  t h e  M o r m o n  
E c c le s ia s t ic a l  C o u r t  S y s t e m
M o rm o n  g en e ra l a u th o r itie s  p u b lic ly  c o n d e m n e d  m em b e rs  fro m  
su in g  o th e r  S a in ts  “ befo re  th e  u n g o d ly ”  a n d  f re q u e n tly  ex to lle d  th e  
c o m p a ra tiv e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  reso lv in g  d isp u te s  w ith in  th e  c h u rc h  c o u r t
160 Doctrine and Convenants, supra note 18, 102:1 (1965).
Id. at 102:2.
162 Id. at 102:26-27.
163 Id. at 107:26.
164 Id. at 102:26-27.
»65 id. at 107:32.
H e i n O n l i n e  -- 12 C a r d o z o  L. Rev. 790 1990 - 1991
1991] T H E  M O R M O N  E X P E R I E N C E 791
system . T h is  co u n se l w as n o t  p u re ly  ad v iso ry . T h e  “ exclusive  ju r is ­
d ic tio n ”  ru le  e n su re d  th a t  m em b e rs  w o u ld  n o t  v ac illa te  b e tw een  
c h u rc h  a n d  c iv il c o u rts , d e p e n d in g  o n  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  e a ch  g iven  
d iffe ren t c irc u m stan c e s . I f  th e y  v a lu e d  c h u rc h  m em b e rsh ip , th e y  h a d  
to  o rd e r  th e ir  p e rso n a l a n d  fin an c ia l a ffa irs w ith  o th e r  m em b e rs  in  
a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  re lig io u s n o rm s  a n d  p recep ts , r a th e r  th a n  se cu la r  
a lte rn a tiv e s .
T h e  few  h is to r ia n s  w h o  h av e  w r itte n  o n  th e  su b jec t a ssu m e d  th a t  
M o rm o n s  lo o k ed  to  th e ir  o w n  c o u rts  o n ly  w h e n  civ il a lte rn a tiv e s  w ere  
u n a v a ilab le  o r  o n ly  so  lo n g  as  th e  M o rm o n s  m a in ta in e d  a n  in d e p e n d ­
e n t a n d  self-sufficien t e c o n o m y .166 B o th  o f  th ese  a ssu m p tio n s  a re  h is ­
to ric a lly  in a c c u ra te  a n d  m is in te rp re t  th e  p u rp o se s  a n d  effects o f  th e  
c h u rc h  c o u r ts ’ ju r is d ic tio n  o v e r civ il d isp u te s  b e tw een  m em b ers . 
C h u rc h  lea d e rs  p e rs is te d  th ro u g h o u t  m o s t o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  
in  th e ir  e ffo rts to  m a in ta in  a n  exc lu sive  ju r is d ic tio n  ru le  in  c iv il m a t­
te r s  b e c au se  M o rm o n  legal p ro cesses  a n d  re su lts  a c c o rd e d  b e tte r  w ith  
th e ir  v ision  o f  Z io n . A lth o u g h  e x c ep tio n s  w ere  o ccas io n a lly  reco g ­
n ized , th e  rea l fo rce  o f  th e  ru le  a b a te d  o n ly  w h en , u n d e r  fed e ra l gov­
e rn m e n t p re ssu re , th e  C h u rc h  re n o u n c e d  p lu ra l  m a rr ia g e  a n d  
p o litic a l d ire c tio n  o f  its  m em b e rs  in  th e  1890s, b o th  key  e lem en ts  in  
th e  c a u se  o f  Z ion . R e c o rd s  o f  c h u rc h  c o u r t  in te rv e n tio n  in  a  c o u r t  
d isp u te  b e tw een  Ju d g e  Z e ru b b a b e l S now  a n d  a  lo ca l c o n s ta b le  filed in  
th e  e a rly  1880s p ro v id e  a n  in fo rm a tiv e  overv iew  o f  th e  exclusive  ju r i s ­
d ic tio n  ru le . Ju d g e  S now  w as a  h ig h ly  in flu en tia l M o rm o n  a tto rn e y  
a n d  w as a p p o in te d  as o n e  o f  th e  firs t a sso c ia te  ju s tic e s  o f  th e  fed e ra l 
c o u r t  in  U ta h  o n  S e p tem b e r 2, 1850. I n  e a rly  1874, C o n g ress  ab o l­
ish e d  th e  te r r i to r ia l  offices b y  e n a c tm e n t o f  th e  P o la n d  A c t, a n d  Snow  
w as  se n t b a c k  in to  p r iv a te  p rac tice .
U n in tim id a te d  by  Ju d g e  S now ’s legal c re d e n tia ls , a  M o rm o n  
c o n s ta b le , C C , o n  J a n u a ry  19, 1880, filed a n  a c tio n  a g a in s t Ju d g e  
S now  fo r  h is  u n -C h ris tia n lik e  c o n d u c t in  su in g  th e  c o n s ta b le  b e fo re  
th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  T h ird  D is tr ic t  C o u r t  fo r th e  T e r r i to ry  o f  U ta h . 
T h e re  w as n o  p a r t ic u la r  L a tte r-d a y  S a in t issue  th a t  w o u ld  h av e  m ad e  
c h u rc h  c o u r t  ju r is d ic tio n  a b so lu te ly  n e c e ssa ry .167 S now  h a d  su e d  C C  
in  fed e ra l d is tr ic t  c o u r t  fo r  m isfeasan ce  in  h is  c a p a c ity  as co n stab le . 
S now  rece iv ed  a  ju d g m e n t fo r  $182 .60 , $132 .60  o f  w h ic h  w as  fo r 
c o u r t  co s ts  a n d  a tto rn e y  fees assessed  a g a in s t th e  c o n s ta b le  as  th e  lo s­
in g  p a rty .
166 See Swenson, Resolution of Civil Disputes by Mormon Ecclesiastical Courts, 1978 Utah 
L. Rev. 573, 594; M. Leone, Roots of Modem Mormonism 120 (1979).
167 See Ecclesiastical Court Cases Collection, General Court Trials 1832-1963, LDS Church 
Archives (cited by folder number and year in notes 168-74).
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C C  c o n su lte d  w ith  th e  w a rd  te a c h e rs  a n d  th e n  filed a  c o m p la in t 
a g a in s t S now  in  B ish o p ’s C o u rt, c h a rg in g  u n -C h ris tia n lik e  c o n d u c t. 
A f te r  h e a rin g  th e  ev idence , th e  b ish o p  c e n su re d  b o th  p a rtie s : th e  c o n ­
s ta b le  fo r  m isfeasance  a n d  Ju d g e  S now  fo r  h is  u n -C h ris tia n lik e  c o n ­
d u c t  in  su in g  th e  c o n s ta b le  b e fo re  th e  d is tr ic t  c o u rt. B ecause  b o th  
h a d  a c te d  im p ro p e rly , h e  o rd e re d  S now  to  rep a y  $100  o f  th e  $182 .60  
th a t  h e  h a d  rec o v e red  f ro m  th e  con stab le .
B y 1884 th e  exclusive  ju r is d ic tio n  ru le  h a d  b een  C h u rc h  po licy  
fo r  m o re  th a n  fo rty  years. A lth o u g h  it  b ecam e  in c re as in g ly  a n a c h ro ­
n istic , th e  C h u rc h  d e lay ed  lay in g  it  aside . C h u rc h  c o u r t  re c o rd s  in d i­
c a te  few  con flic ts  o v e r th e  ju r is d ic tio n  issue  in  h e a rin g s  h e ld  a f te r  
s ta te h o o d  w as g ran te d . H o w ev er, a t  lea s t som e  p r ie s th o o d  c o u rts  
sa n c tio n e d  m em b e rs  fo r su in g  o th e r  m em b e rs  in  th e  c iv il c o u r ts  as 
la te  as 1900.
C . M o r m o n  O p p o s itio n  to  L a w y e r s  a n d  T e c h n ic a l i t ie s
L aw y ers  w ere  in  a  p re c a r io u s  p o s itio n  in  th e  ea rly  d e cad es  o f  
M o rm o n  h is to ry . P r ie s th o o d  lea d e rs  c o n s is ten tly  c o n d e m n e d  th e m  
fo r  u rg in g  v ex a tio u s  law su its , fo r  c h a rg in g  e x o rb ita n t fees in  a  cash - 
p o o r  f ro n tie r  eco n o m y , fo r  th e  su b o rd in a tio n  o f  “ t r u th ”  to  th e  a d v e r­
sa ry  e th ic , a n d  fo r  th e ir  u se  o f  legal tec h n ica litie s . T h e  C h u rc h , th e re ­
fo re , b a n n e d  law y ers  fro m  c h u rc h  c o u rts , a lth o u g h  law y ers  invo lved  
in  p rev io u s  civ il l itig a tio n  o f  a  case  o c c as io n a lly  a p p e a re d  as  w it­
nesses. P re su m a b ly  M o rm o n  law y ers  e a rn e d  th e ir  fees re p re se n tin g  
M o rm o n s  in  c rim in a l a c tio n s  a n d  su its  a g a in s t e ith e r  a p o s ta te s  o r  
n o n -M o rm o n s , a n d  by  re p re se n tin g  n o n m em b e rs .
T h e  p ro p r ie ty  o f  law y ers  re p re se n tin g  m em b e rs  in  c iv il su its  
a g a in s t o th e r  M o rm o n s , th e re fo re , w as a  m a t te r  o f  c o n c e rn  fo r  fa i th ­
fu l M o rm o n  a tto rn e y s . I f  i t  w as u n -C h r is t ia n  fo r  a  m e m b e r  to  sue  
a n o th e r  m e m b e r  in  th e  c iv il c o u rts , w h a t a b o u t th e  M o rm o n  law y er 
w h o  rep re se n te d  a  c iv il c o m p la in a n t?  F o r  ex am p le , in  a n  1882 case  
h e a rd  b y  th e  B ox  E ld e r  H ig h  C o u n c il, M o rm o n  a tto rn e y  G e o rg e  
M a rs h  fo u n d  h is  o w n  m e m b e rsh ip  in  q u e s tio n  fo r  “ w ro n g fu l [sic] 
co u n se llin g , a id in g  a n d  a b e ttin g ”  a  M o rm o n  p la in tif f  in  a  c iv il su it.
In  defense  o f  h is  a c tio n , M a rs h  ex p la in ed  th a t  “ h e  w as a  c o u n se l­
lo r  a t  law ; h a d  ta k e n  th e  o a th  to  th a t  effect [he h a d  b een  a d m itte d  to  
th e  U ta h  b a r  in  1877 a fte r  s tu d y in g  law  a t  h o m e]— a n d  h a d  n o  b u s i­
ness to  a sk  p a rtie s  w h e th e r  th e y  w ere  M o rm o n  o r  g en tile s .”  T h e  
sp e a k e r  fo r C R  (p la in tiff)  s ta te d  th a t  h e  believed  B ro th e r  M a rs h  “ h as  
n o t a c te d  w isely  in  lab o rin g  to  a id  a  w ick ed  m a n  in  ev ad in g  r ig h ts  a n d  
ju s tic e .”  T h e  sp e ak e r  fo r  M a rs h  agreed! T h e  s ta k e  p re s id e n t, “ a f te r  
lis ten in g  a tte n tiv e ly  to  a ll d e c id e d  th a t  B ro th e r  M a rs h  h a d  a c te d  u n ­
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w isely  in  th is  m a t te r .”  A c c o rd in g ly , “ as  a  p a r t ia l  re im b u rse m e n t fo r 
th e  losses a n d  d a m a g e  su s ta in e d  th ro u g h  p ro se c u tio n  o f  th is  case ,”  
M a rs h  w as  o rd e re d  to  p a y  th e  c iv il d e fe n d a n t fifty d o l la r s .168
M o rm o n  ju d g es , w h e th e r  s it t in g  as  b ish o p rics , o n  h ig h  councils , 
o r  o n  c o u r ts  o f  ap p ea l, d eem ed  g en tile  law  la rg e ly  irre le v a n t; th ey  
fash io n e d  d ec is io n s  to  fit th e  n eed s  a n d  c irc u m stan c e s  o f  c itizen s  o f  
Z io n . In  1852, fo r  exam p le , five y e a rs  a f te r  th e  M o rm o n s  a rr iv e d  in  
th e  G re a t  B asin , th e  S a lt L a k e  H ig h  C o u n c il h e a rd  a  d isp u te  o v e r  th e  
o w n e rsh ip  o f  a  cow . O n e  p a r ty  o b jec ted  to  th e  ev idence  p ro ffe red  by  
th e  o th e r  p a r ty  as  in ad m iss ib le  in  a  c o u r t  o f  law , b u t  a  sp e ak e r  fo r  th e  
o th e r  p a r ty  resp o n d e d :
This is a  court got up by D ivine Revelation to  adjust difficulties 
am ong m em bers o f the C hurch, and we occupy the position o f ser­
vants also to those passing th rough  here, who pu t themselves 
under ou r protection. W e wish it understood th a t technicalities 
th a t are taken advantage o f elsewhere are laid aside here and all we 
wish is to  get all the  tru th  and justice o f the case agreeable to  the 
R evelations.169
T h e  ev idence  in  th is  case  d id  n o t  e s tab lish  c le a r  o w n e rsh ip  b y  e ith e r  
p a r ty .170 In  a  c o u r t  o f  law , th e  p la in tif f  w o u ld  h av e  lo s t b ecau se  h e  
h a d  n o t m e t th e  b u rd e n  o f  p e rsu a s io n , b u t  th e  c h u rc h  c o u rts  ap p lied  
d iffe ren t ru le s . A f te r  ack n o w led g in g  th e  fa ilu re  to  a rr iv e  a t  a  c le a r  
re so lu tio n , th e  h ig h  c o u n c il a sk ed  th e  s ta k e  p re s id e n t fo r  a  d ec is ion  
fee ling  th a t  i t  “ w o u ld  be  fu ll o f  lig h t a c c o rd in g  to  th e  office u p o n  
h im .”
A lth o u g h  th e  c h u rc h  c o u rts  fe lt u n h a m p e re d  b y  civ il ru les , th e y  
o c c as io n a lly  c o n s id e red  th e m  if  th e y  se rv ed  th e  b e s t in te re s t o f  th e  
c o m m u n ity . In  o n e  in te re s tin g  1873 case  in v o lv in g  th e  c o m p u ta tio n  
o f  in te re s t o n  a  c o n tra c t , th e  S a lt L a k e  H ig h  C o u n c il p e rm itte d  th e  
p a rtie s  to  b e  re p re se n te d  b y  co u n se l, w h o  w ere  to  a rg u e  th e  “ la w ” 
b e c au se  th e  h ig h  c o u n c il th o u g h t  Z io n  w o u ld  be  b e tte r  se rv ed  by  fo l­
lo w in g  th e  re le v a n t c iv il r u le .171 T h e  h ig h  c o u n c il u n d o u b te d ly  h o p e d  
to  e s ta b lish  c o n sis ten cy  in  c o m m e rc ia l b u s in ess  p rac tic e s , a  n ecessa ry  
v ir tu e  even  in  Z io n . T h e  case  re p re se n ts  a n  e x cep tio n  to  th e  u su a l 
p ra c tic e , n o t  a  m o v e  to w a rd  “ e c o n o m ic  a ss im ila tio n .”  In  o th e r  a reas  
o f  law , c h u rc h  c o u rts  ro u tin e ly  ex c lu d e d  a tto rn e y s , d is re g a rd e d  legal 
p re c e d e n t, a n d  fash io n e d  d ec is io n s  as re q u ire d  by  th e  e q u itie s  o f  th e  
p a r t ic u la r  case.
»68 Folder 9 (1852).
Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at folder 10 (1873).
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D . T h e  M o r m o n  P r e fe r e n c e  f o r  A r b i t r a t io n
A fte r  th e ir  a rr iv a l in  U ta h , th e  S a in ts  fre q u e n tly  re lied  o n  a rb i­
t ra t io n  to  reso lve  d ifficulties. E a c h  p a r ty  w o u ld  se lec t a  referee , a n d  
th e  refe rees w o u ld  se lec t a  tie -b re a k in g  referee. T h e  refe rees w o u ld  
in v es tig a te  th e  m a t te r  a n d  th e n  m ee t to g e th e r  fo r  a n  a rb i tra te d  re so lu ­
tio n . O ccas io n a lly  th e  a rb i tra to r s  s im p ly  se rved  as e x p e rt w itnesses  in 
c h u rc h  c o u r t  p roceed ings.
A rb itr a t io n  w as espec ially  u se fu l in  cases re q u ir in g  ex tensive  a c ­
c o u n tin g  ana ly sis, su c h  as c o n s tru c tio n  c o n tra c t  d isp u tes . F o r  e x a m ­
p le, in  1869, th e  S alt L a k e  H ig h  C o u n c il a ssig n ed  a rb i tra to r s  to  a  case  
in v o lv in g  a  co m p lex  se t o f  c o n tra c ts  e x te n d in g  o v e r a  n u m b e r  o f  
years . T h e  h ig h  c o u n c il a u th o r iz e d  th e  a rb i tra to r s  to  m ak e  a  re c o m ­
m e n d a tio n  su b jec t to  th e  su p e rio r  w isd o m  o f  th e  co u n c il, r a th e r  th a n  
to  m a k e  a  final decision . B ish o p s a n d  s ta k e  p re s id e n ts  o ccas io n a lly  
u sed  a rb i tra tio n  w h ere  a  h e a rin g  b e fo re  th e  re g u la r  c o u r t  ra ise d  a  c o n ­
flict o f  in te res t. F o r  exam p le , w h en  a  p a r ty  h a d  a  c o n tra c tu a l  c la im  
a g a in s t th e  C h u rc h  a n d  so u g h t red re ss  in  th e  c h u rc h  c o u rts , a rb i t r a ­
tio n  p ro v id e d  a  so lu tio n  th a t  w o u ld  p re v e n t a  con flic t o f  in te re s t .172 
C h u rc h  officials a lso  u sed  a rb i tra tio n  in  su its  a g a in s t p o litic a l su b d iv i­
s io n s173 a n d  c ity  c o u n c ils .174 I t  is a p p a re n t  th a t  c h u rc h  tr ib u n a ls  gave 
su b s ta n tia l d e fe ren ce  to  th e  find ings o f  a rb i tra to r s  even  th o u g h  th e ir  
re c o m m e n d a tio n s  w ere  n o t b in d in g .
E . D e c is io n a l  S t a n d a r d s
T ra n sg re ss io n s  a g a in s t b asic  soc ia l s ta n d a rd s , in c lu d in g  a d u lte ry , 
th e f t , m u rd e r , a n d  ly in g  po sed  n o  specia l p ro b le m s fo r c h u rc h  c o u rts . 
B u t w h ere  a  case  invo lved  p ro p e r ty , c o n tra c ts , to r ts , o r  d o m es tic  d is ­
p u te s , th e  a p p ro p r ia te  dec is io n a l s ta n d a rd  w as less c lea r. T h e  c o u rts  
ju s tified  w h a te v e r  d ec is io n s  th e y  m a d e  less o n  a rg u m e n ts  o f  fo rm a l 
ju s tic e  th a n  th e  in sp ired  “ h ig h e r  law ” o f  Z ion .
O n e  s c h o la r  w h o  in v es tig a ted  th e  ecclesias tica l c o u r ts  o f  a  sing le  
M o rm o n  s ta k e  in  A r iz o n a  be tw een  1884 a n d  1896 a rg u e d  th a t  th ese  
“ p ro cesses  p red isp o sed  M o rm o n s  to  a d ju s t, a d a p t, a n d  c o n tin u a lly  
c h a n g e  th e  m ean in g s  a n d  d e fin itions  th a t  th e y  a p p lie d  to  th e  w h o le  o f  
life . . . .  B y n o t u s in g  p re c e d e n t, o r  n o t co n s id e rin g  th e  c o n te x t o f  
a n y  p a s t  ev en t u sed  as a  c ita tio n , o r  n o t  h a v in g  law y ers  . . .  a  g o v e rn ­
m e n t th a t  u sed  sa n c tity  to  ru le  fo rg o t its  o w n  h is to ry .” 175
T h is  o b se rv a tio n  is em p iric a lly  in a c c u ra te . M o rm o n  c o m m u n i­
•72 id. at folder 9 (1878).
173 Id. at folder 6 (1866).
m  Id. at folder 7 (1864).
175 See M. Leone, supra note 166, at 117, 146.
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ties, c o m p rise d  la rg e ly  o f  m em b e rs  f ro m  w ide ly  v a ry in g  b a c k g ro u n d s , 
a c ce p ted  th e  n eed  to  a d a p t  to  th e ir  new  c o m m u n ity , a n d  c h u rc h  c o u rt 
ru le s  o ften  re flec ted  th ese  ch an g es. B u t p a s t  even ts  w ere  c ritic a l in  th e  
p ro cess  o f  a d a p ta tio n . H ig h  c o u n c ils  d id  n o t  m a k e  a d  h o c  d ec is ions  
in  e a ch  case. In s te a d  th e y  re lied  ex tensively  o n  s c rip tu re  a n d  in s tru c ­
tio n s  f ro m  C h u rc h  lead ers , w h ic h  w ere  so o n  em b o d ied  in  loca l c u s ­
to m s. In  fac t, th e  dec is ions  a re  re m a rk a b ly  u n ifo rm , w h e th e r  in  la n d  
a n d  w a te r  d isp u te s , c o n tra c ts , sex u a l m o ra lity , o r  p lu ra l  m arriag es . 
A lth o u g h  an y  c u s to m a ry  ru le  o r  p a s t ex p erien ce  w as su b jec t to  a d ­
ju s tm e n t  th ro u g h  in sp ira tio n , a b e rra tio n s  co u ld  a lw ays be  ap p ea led . 
In  sh o rt, a l th o u g h  p re c e d e n t n e v e r  c o n tro lle d  c h u rc h  c o u r t  decisions, 
a n d  c a n o n  law  n e v e r  d ev e lo p ed  as  a  lim ita tio n  o n  th e  d isc re tio n  o f  
lo ca l lea d e rs , c h u rc h  c o u r t  dec is ions  w ere  b ro a d ly  c o n s is ten t th ro u g h ­
o u t  th e  p e rio d .
F . M o r m o n  S u b s ta n t i v e  L a w
A s m ig h t b e  ex p ec ted , th e  su b s ta n tiv e  law  ap p lied  in  th e  ecclesi­
a s tic a l M o rm o n  c o u rts  b o th  fo llow ed  a n d  d e p a r te d  fro m  th e  se cu la r 
law  d ev e lo p in g  in  th e  c iv il c o u r ts  o f  n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry  A m e ric a . In  
th e  a re a  o f  t o r t  law , fo r  ex am p le , th e  M o rm o n s ’ d ec is io n s  p a ra lle led  
th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  to r t  law  in  th e  se cu la r  system . In  o th e r  a reas , 
su c h  as  in  th e  a c q u is itio n  a n d  tra n s fe r  o f  la n d  a n d  w a te r  r ig h ts , th e  
c h u rc h  c o u rts  a p p lie d  a  d is tin c tiv e ly  M o rm o n  a p p ro a c h  to  th e  law . 
In  a ll a re a s  o f  th e  law , th e  in te r re la tio n sh ip  o f  M o rm o n  b e lie f  a n d  
c iv il law  in flu en ced  a n d  c o n tro lle d  th e  o u tc o m e  o f  d isp u te s  in  M o r ­
m o n  c o u rts .
T h e  C h u rc h ’s in n o v a tiv e  la n d  d is tr ib u tio n  po licy , fo r  exam p le , 
p e rm itte d  th e  sy s te m a tic  a n d  re la tiv e ly  h a rm o n io u s  c o lo n iz a tio n  o f  
th e  G re a t  B asin , e n c o u ra g e d  c o o p e ra tiv e  fen c in g  a n d  irr ig a tio n , a n d  
re in fo rc e d  th e  ro le  o f  c h u rc h  c o u rts  in  reso lv in g  e c o n o m ic  conflicts. 
T h e  M o rm o n s , o f  c o u rse , w ere  n o t  th e  o n ly  se ttle rs  in  th e  G re a t  B a ­
sin , so  th e y  so o n  re in fo rc e d  th e  ecc lesias tica l la n d  po licy  w ith  te r r i to ­
r ia l  leg is la tio n . U n fo r tu n a te ly , th e  S a in ts  h a d  n o  legal a u th o r i ty  to  
leg itim ize  la n d  g ra n ts , a n d  in  1869, w h en  th e  first la n d  office opened , 
th e  fed e ra l g o v e rn m e n t in s is te d  o n  a p p ly in g  its  o w n  h o m e s te a d  a n d  
p re e m p tio n  ru les .
I t  is c le a r  th a t  c h u rc h  c o u rts , a s  lo n g  as th e y  d ec id ed  la n d  d is ­
p u tes , a p p lie d  a  d is tin c tiv e ly  M o rm o n  a p p ro a c h  to  la n d  o w n e rsh ip  
issues. B enefic ia l use , p r io r  o cc u p an c y , a n d  c o m m u n ity  h a rm o n y , n o t 
lega l r ig h ts , w e re  th e  g u id in g  p rin c ip le s . In  a d d itio n  to  m o d ify in g  th e  
su b s ta n tiv e  ru le s  o n  la n d  d is tr ib u tio n , c h u rc h  c o u rts  e n c o u ra g e d  c o m ­
p ro m ise , m a d e  se ttle m e n ts  o n  th e  basis  o f  eq u ity , e m p h a s ize d  co llec ­
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tiv e  c o n c e rn s  o v e r  p r iv a te  in te re s ts , a n d  re m in d e d  m em b ers  th a t  Z io n  
h a d  a  h ig h e r  law  th a n  th e  su rro u n d in g  society . A lth o u g h  n o n m e m ­
b e rs  a n d  d iss id en ts  re s is ted  th e  exclusive  ju r is d ic tio n  o f  c h u rc h  c o u rts , 
th e  C h u rc h ’s a c tu a l w ith d ra w a l f ro m  th o se  cases ca m e  lo n g  a f te r  fed ­
e ra l c o u r ts  w ere  in  p lace . C h u rc h  c o u rts  finally  s te p p e d  b a c k  fro m  
la n d  d isp u te s  as  p a r t  o f  th e  C h u rc h ’s red e fin itio n  o f  Z ion .
M o rm o n  w a te r  law  is a n o th e r  ex am p le  o f  a n  a re a  w h ere  M o rm o n  
su b s ta n tiv e  law  d iv erg ed  fro m  th e  s ta n d a rd s  o f  th e  civ il system . Soon  
a f te r  th e  S a in ts  e n te re d  th e  S a lt L a k e  V alley , B rig h am  Y o u n g  a n ­
n o u n c e d  th re e  b asic  p rin c ip le s  th a t  w ere  to  c o n tro l M o rm o n  w a te r  
law . T h e  firs t a d d re sse d  p u b lic  o w n e rsh ip  o f  n a tu ra l  re so u rces , d is ­
c la im in g  p r iv a te  o w n e rsh ip  o f  th e  s tre a m s, a n d  d e c la rin g  th a t  th ese  
b e lo n g ed  to  th e  p e o p le .176 B y ig n o rin g  r ip a r ia n  la n d o w n e r  e n title ­
m en ts , th e  C h u rc h  w as ab le  to  c o n tro l th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  a  lim ite d  
w a te r  su p p ly  a n d  in c rease  th e  h a b ita b ility  o f  la n d  th a t  d id  n o t a b u t 
r iv e rs  a n d  s tre a m s. I f  se ttle rs  w h o  w ere  m iles aw ay  fro m  th e  w a te r  
so u rc e  c o u ld  o b ta in  w a te r  fo r  d o m es tic  a n d  a g r ic u ltu ra l  p u rp o se s  by  
p u b lic  g ra n t, th e n  e n tire  valleys c o u ld  be  se ttle d  ra th e r  th a n  ju s t  th e  
r iv e r  b an k s . T h is  po licy , th e re fo re , w as a n  im p o r ta n t  a lte rn a tiv e  to  
th e  c o m m o n  law  p rin c ip le  o f  r ip a r ia n  r ig h ts .
T h e  seco n d  p rin c ip le  o f  M o rm o n  w a te r  law  inv o lv ed  e n title m e n t 
ru le s  d ire c te d  by  th e  p r ie s th o o d .177 In itia lly  eq u a l d is tr ib u tio n  w as 
ap p lied . Soon  p r ie s th o o d  ru le s  o f  p r io r ity  a n d  beneficia l u se  em erged . 
P r io r i ty  p ro v id e d  a  s ta n d a rd  fo r  m e d ia tin g  b e tw een  c la im s o f  
eq u iv a len t beneficia l use, w h ile  beneficia l u se  lim ite d  w a te r  c la im s to  
th o se  b ased  o n  need  a n d  u se  r a th e r  th a n  p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts . T h ese  p r in ­
cip les p ro v id e d  a  s ta n d a rd  fo r e v a lu a tin g  p u b lic  a p p lic a tio n s  a n d  m e ­
d ia tin g  conflicts. T h e y  a lso  p rev e n ted  m o n o p o ly  c o n tro l, sp e cu la tio n , 
a n d  h o a rd in g  o f  w a te r  supp lies .
T h e  th ird  p rin c ip le  o f  M o rm o n  w a te r  law , co o p e ra tiv e  i r r ig a ­
t io n ,178 w as fo llow ed  b y  c o m m u n itie s  th ro u g h o u t  th e  G re a t  B asin . 
E a r ly  h ig h  c o u n c ils  d ire c te d  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  c a n a ls  a n d  d itc h e s  to  
c a rry  w a te r  f ro m  c a n y o n  riv e rs  a n d  s tre a m s  to  th e  v a rio u s  w a rd s  in  
th e  valleys. T h e  b ish o p s  th e n  d ire c te d  th e  d iv is io n  o f  th ese  d itc h e s  to  
ea ch  b lo ck  in  th e ir  w ard s , a n d  u ltim a te ly  to  e ach  u se r. T h e  u se rs  
w ere  resp o n sib le  fo r  m a in ta in in g  th a t  p a r t  o f  th e  d itc h , d e p e n d in g  on  
th e  ac reag e  h e ld  a n d  th e  in te n d e d  use. A  w a te rm a s te r , o r ig in a lly  th e  
b ish o p  b u t  la te r  a  fu ll-tim e  officer, re g u la te d  th e  use  a n d  m a in te n a n c e  
o f  th e  loca l ir r ig a tio n  system . E v e n tu a lly  th e  irr ig a tio n  c o o p e ra tiv es
176 See 3 B. Roberts, supra note 14, at 269.
177 See generally G. Thomas, The Development of Institutions Under Irrigation (1920).
»7» Id.
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w ere  o rg an iz ed  in to  se lf-co n ta in ed  c o m p an ies  a n d  th e n  n o n p ro fit 
c o rp o ra tio n s .179
T h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  ecc lesias tica l c o u r t  sy stem  c a n n o t be  o v e r­
em p h asized . T h ro u g h  th ese  c o u rts , a  po licy  o f  p u b lic  c o n tro l  o v e r 
w a te r  reso u rc es  w as s u b s titu te d  fo r  th e  c o m m o n  law  d o c tr in e  o f  r ip a ­
r ia n  r ig h ts . T h e  M o rm o n s  a p p lie d  a n  in n o v a tiv e  d o c tr in e  o f  beneficia l 
u se  a n d  assis ted  co o p e ra tiv e  irr ig a tio n  c o m p an ies  in  w o rk in g  fo r  th e  
m o re  efficient a n d  eq u ita b le  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  lim ite d  w a te r  reso u rces . 
T h e  c h u rc h  c o u rts  en fo rc e d  e a ch  o f  th ese  p o licy  ob jec tives fo r  m an y  
years , d e sp ite  th e  a v a ilab ility  o f  a lte rn a tiv e  civ il fo ru m s.
C o n tra c t  d isp u te s  ra ise d  specia l th eo lo g ic a l a n d  h is to r ic a l 
p ro b le m s fo r  c h u rc h  c o u rts . D o c tr in a lly  th e  M o rm o n  litu rg y  o f  cove­
n a n ts  b e a rs  c lose  rese m b la n c e  to  c o n tra c t . B ap tism , sa c ra m e n t, a n d  
te m p le  o rd in a n c e s , fo r  exam p le , a ll specify  re c ip ro c a l b lessings in  ex ­
c h a n g e  fo r obed ience . A c c o u n ta b ili ty  fo r  c o v e n an ts  tea c h e s  m o ra l re ­
sp o n sib ility  w h ile  re in fo rc in g  h u m a n  agency . In  te m p o ra l affairs, 
en fo rc in g  c o n tra c ts  likew ise  te a c h e s  re sp o n sib ility  w h ile  re sp e c tin g  
th e  fre e d o m  o f  th e  c o n tra c tin g  p a rtie s . N e v e rth e le ss , M o rm o n  th e o l­
ogy  a lso  tea c h e s  a n  e th ic  o f  re sp o n sib ility  fo r  o th e rs , free ly  ac ce p ted  
by  c o v e n a n t a t  th e  tim e  o f  b a p tism . T h e  fam ilia r  a n tin o m ie s  o f  ju s tic e  
a n d  m erc y  re p re se n te d  by  th ese  o p p o sin g  v iew s ra ise d  d ifficu lt issues 
fo r  M o rm o n  a d ju d ic a to rs  c o n s id e rin g  c o n tra c tu a l  d isp u tes .
C h u rc h  c o u rts  in  c o n tra c t  cases reco g n ized  civ il ru le s  a s  re lev an t, 
a l th o u g h  n o t  n ecessa rily  b in d in g . T h e  c iv il ru le s  w ere  co n s id e red  
h e lp fu l b ecau se  th e y  reflec ted  n o rm a l co m m e rc ia l p ra c tic e s  a n d  
w o u ld  h e lp  m a k e  b u s in ess  p rac tic e s  in  th e  G re a t  B asin  m o re  co n sis ­
te n t. A  c la im a n t w h o  fe lt h e  h a d  c o n tra c t  law  o n  h is  side, how ever, 
c o u ld  n o t be  a b so lu te ly  su re  th a t  a  c h u rc h  c o u r t  w o u ld  see it  th e  sam e 
w ay . T h is  w as espec ia lly  t ru e  w h e n  a  p o in t o f  c o n tra c tu a l  law  c o n ­
ta in e d  tec h n ica litie s  o r  su b tle tie s  th a t  m ig h t o ffend  a n  ecclesias tica l 
c o u r t ’s sense  o f  su b s ta n tiv e  ju s tice .
B y a c ce p tin g  c o n tra c t  law  as re lev an t, th e  c h u rc h  c o u rts  m a d e  
th e  L a tte r-d a y  S a in t ec o n o m y  efficient a n d  resp o n siv e  to  th e  n a tio n a l 
eco n o m y ; by  re ta in in g  th e  p o w e r to  go  b e y o n d  legal tech n ica litie s , 
th e y  c o n tin u e d  to  affirm  th e  o v e rr id in g  im p o r ta n c e  o f  b u ild in g  th e  
K in g d o m  o f  G o d . B y p ro v id in g  a  fo ru m  w ith o u t c o u r t  co sts , legal 
fees, o r  th e  d iv isive in fluence  o f  “ g e n tile ”  law yers, th e  L a tte r-d a y  
S a in ts  effectively  m a in ta in e d  a  s e p a ra te  c o m m u n ity  th ro u g h o u t  th e  
n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry .
T o r t  c la im s in  M o rm o n  c o u rts  s im ila rly  ex h ib it th e  c lose  re la ­
179 See generally, Swenson, A primer of Utah Law: Part I, 5 J. Energy & Pol*y 165, 166-69 
(1984); E. Mead, Irrigation Institutions 220-46 (1903).
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t io n sh ip  be tw een  re lig io u s d u tie s  a n d  socia l ob lig a tio n s . B y re q u ir in g  
m em b e rs  to  b r in g  th ese  c la im s to  c h u rc h  c o u rts  r a th e r  th a n  c iv il 
c o u rts , th e  ecc lesias tica l s tru c tu re  co u ld  a c c o m m o d a te  b o th  o f  th ese  
s ta n d a rd s . M e m b ers  w ere  e n c o u ra g e d  to  seek  am icab le  se ttle m en t; 
b u t  fa iling  th a t ,  th ey  w o u ld  b r in g  c o m p la in ts  to  th e  c h u rc h  c o u rts , 
w h e re  th e y  w o u ld  be  h e a rd  in  a  re lig io u s e n v iro n m e n t o f  s h a re d  r ig h ts  
a n d  d u tie s . A s  m em b ers  o f  th e  re lig io u s c o m m u n ity , th e y  h a d  d is tin c ­
tive  m o ra l s ta n d a rd s , w h ich  th e y  defined  a n d  refined  th ro u g h  th e ir  
o w n  c o u rt  system . T h e y  d id  n o t u se  th e  te rm in o lo g y  o f  to r t  law , b u t 
th e ir  dec is ions  p a ra lle led  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  to r t  law  in  la te  n in e ­
te e n th -c e n tu ry  A m e ric a n  c o u rts .
V. T h e  C o u n t e r -u s e  o f  t h e  L a w : D is e s t a b l is h m e n t
o f  t h e  C h u r c h
A fte r  e n d u rin g  su c h  a  to r tu re d  p ro cess  o f  leg isla tive  a n d  ju d ic ia l 
p e rse c u tio n , i t  is n o t  su rp ris in g  th a t  th e  C h u rc h ’s lea d e rs  h a rb o re d  a  
d eep  d is tru s t  o f  law y ers  a n d  th e  fo rm a litie s  o f  th e  law . In  th e  G re a t  
B asin , C h u rc h  lea d e rs  a tte m p te d  to  n e u tra liz e  h a ra s s m e n t th ro u g h  a  
c o u n te r-u se  o f  th e  law . In  1851, th e  A ssem b ly  o f  th e  S ta te  o f  D e se re t 
p assed  an  o rd in a n c e  in c o rp o ra tin g  th e  C h u rc h  o f  Je su s  C h r is t  o f  L a t­
te r-d a y  S a in ts .180 By th e  te rm s  o f  th is  c h a r te r , th e  C h u rc h  w as 
g ra n te d  v as t p o w e rs .181 I t  co u ld  a c q u ire  a n d  sell p ro p e r ty , re g u la te  
m arria g e s , reg is te r  b ir th s  a n d  d e a th s , a n d  m ak e  a ll law s, ru le s , a n d  
a d ju d ic a tio n s  it  d eem ed  n ecessary . I t  w as a lso  n o t  su b jec t to  legal 
re v ie w .182
H a v in g  been  legally  en d o w ed  w ith  a ll n ecessa ry  pow ers , th e  
C h u rc h  w as p re su m a b ly  freed  f ro m  p e tty  legal ch a llenges . A rm e d  
w ith  th ese  pow ers , i t  b ecam e  d eep ly  in v o lv ed  in  m e m b e rs ’ eco n o m ic  
lives. I t  e s tab lish ed  itse lf  as a  m a jo r  b u sin ess  in te re s t in  U ta h , a n d  
c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  C h u rc h ’s c o m m u n a l d o c tr in e s , h e ld  a  m a jo r  p o r ­
tio n  o f  th e  M o rm o n s ’ co llec tive  w ea lth . T h e se  po lic ies  m a d e  th e  
C h u rc h  q u ite  v u ln e ra b le  to  fed era l p ressu re . T h e  se izu re  o f  C h u rc h  
p ro p e r ty  w o u ld  be  a  d e v a s ta tin g  b lo w  to  th e  e n tire  M o rm o n  c o m m u ­
n ity . T h e  fed era l g o v e rn m e n t d id  n o t h e s ita te  lo n g  b e fo re  it  u sed  th is  
u ltim a te  w eapon . T h e  M o rr ill  A c t  o f  1862 rev o k ed  th e  c h a r te r  in c o r ­
p o ra tin g  th e  M o rm o n  C h u rc h , a t  lea s t in so fa r  a s  th a t  c h a r te r  su p -
180 See 6 B. Roberts, A Comprehensive History of the Arrival of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints 193-94 (1930).
■si Id.182 United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 5 Utah 361, 363-65, 15 P. 
473, 474-75 (1887).
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p o r te d  o r  a id e d  p o ly g a m y .183
N o  a tte m p t w as m a d e  to  en fo rce  th e  fo rfe itu re  o f  C h u rc h  p ro p ­
e rty , b u t  th e  C h u rc h  to o k  th is  w a rn in g  se rio u sly  even  th o u g h  th e  A c t 
w as g e n e ra lly  believed  to  b e  u n c o n s titu tio n a l. T o  b r in g  them se lves  
in to  w h a t th e y  believed  to  be  te c h n ic a l co m p lia n c e  w ith  th e  A c t, th e  
M o rm o n s  in itia te d  a  po licy  o f  p lac in g  p ro p e r ty  in  th e  h a n d s  o f  in d i­
v id u a l C h u rc h  lea d e rs  as t ru s te e s - in - tru s t.184
W ith  th e  1887 E d m u n d s -T u c k e r  A c t ,185 C o n g ress  to ld  th e  
C h u rc h  to  a b a n d o n  th e  p ra c tic e  o f  p lu ra l m a rr ia g e  o r  face  d e s tru c ­
tio n . T h e  m e c h a n ism  o f  d e s tru c tio n  w o u ld  be  co n fisca tio n  o f  C h u rc h  
p ro p e r ty . S ec tio n  13 o f  th e  A c t  d ire c te d  th e  A tto rn e y  G e n e ra l o f  th e  
U n ite d  S ta te s  to  in s ti tu te  p ro ce e d in g s  p u rs u a n t  to  th e  M o rr i ll  A c t o f  
1862 to  con fisca te  a ll C h u rc h  rea l e s ta te  in  excess o f  $50 ,000  in  
v a lu e .186 C o n g re ssio n a l leg is la tio n  specified  th a t  o n ly  th e  C h u rc h ’s 
re a l p ro p e r ty  w as su b jec t to  se izu re; b u t  b ecau se  th e  M o rr i ll  A c t  a r ­
g u ab ly  rev o k e d  th e  C h u rc h ’s c h a r te r  in  its  e n tire ty , th e  C h u rc h  n o  
lo n g e r  ex is ted  as a  b o d y  ca p ab le  o f  h o ld in g  p ro p e r ty  in  th e  eyes o f  th e  
law . T h u s , su c h  p e rso n a l p ro p e r ty  as s to ck s , livestock , a n d  fu rn itu re  
w ere  left ow n erless  a n d  fo rfe ited  to  th e  s ta te . A n tic ip a tin g  p assag e  o f  
th e  E d m u n d s -T u c k e r  A c t, M o rm o n  lea d e rs  in c re ase d  th e ir  e ffo rts to  
p lac e  th e  C h u rc h ’s p ro p e r ty  b e y o n d  th e  re a c h  o f  th e  fed e ra l g o v e rn ­
m en t. O n  Ju ly  30, 1887, th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  A tto rn e y  fo r  U ta h  in itia te d  
p ro ce e d in g s  b e fo re  th e  te r r ito r ia l  su p re m e  c o u r t  to  d isso lve  th e  
C h u rc h  c o rp o ra tio n  a n d  to  reco v e r a ll p ro p e r ty  h e ld  b y  th e  C h u rc h  
e x cep t fo r  an y  re a l p ro p e r ty  a c q u ire d  p r io r  to  1862 a n d  v a lu e d  a t  less 
th a n  $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 .187 A s  in  th e  R e y n o ld s  p o ly g am y  tr ia l, th e  M o rm o n s  
o v e re s tim a te d  th e  rea d in ess  o f  th e  c o u rts  to  a c c e p t th e ir  legal a rg u ­
m en ts . B u t u n lik e  th e  co n seq u en ces  o f  R e y n o ld s ,  th e  p ro p e r ty  confis­
c a tio n s  w ere  a  d e a th  b low .
In  th e  firs t c h a llen g e  to  th e  E d m u n d s -T u c k e r  A c t’s se izu re  p ro v i­
sions, U n i te d  S ta t e s  v. C h u r c h  o f  J e s u s  C h r is t  o f  L a t t e r - d a y  S a i n t s , 188 
th e  M o rm o n s  a rg u e d  th a t  th e  te r r ito r ia l  c h a r te r  g iven  to  th e  C h u rc h  
c o n s ti tu te d  a  r ig h t  th a t  C o n g ress  co u ld  n o t  c o n s titu tio n a lly  nu llify . 
R e ly in g  o n  th e  la n d m a rk  case  o f  D a r tm o u th  C o lle g e  v. W o o d w a r d  189 
fo r  th e  p ro p o s itio n  th a t  th e  c h a r te r  o f  a  p r iv a te  c o rp o ra tio n  w as a  
c o n tra c t  b e tw een  th e  s ta te  a n d  th e  c o rp o ra tio n , th e  M o rm o n s  a rg u e d
>83 See Morrill Act, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
184 L. Arrington & D. Bitton, supra note 41, at 356.
185 Edmunds Act, ch. 47, §§ 1-9, 22 Stat. 30-32 (1882) (amended 1887, repealed 1909).
18<* 24 Stat. 637 (1862).
187 See 6 B. Roberts, supra note 14, at 219-21.
188 5 Utah 361, 15 P. 473 (Utah 1887).
189 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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t h a t  th e ir  r ig h t to  a c q u ire  a n d  h o ld  p ro p e r ty  w as a  vested , c o n tra c tu a l  
r ig h t  th a t  c o u ld  n o t be  im p a ire d . T h is  a rg u m e n t w as re jec ted . T h e  
c o u r t  r a th e r  vaguely  suggested  th a t  a  leg is la tu re  c o u ld  n o t  p ro p e r ly  
d e leg a te  so  b ro a d  a  ran g e  o f  p o w ers  as  th e  M o rm o n  C h u rc h  w as 
g ra n te d  in  its  c h a rte r .
M o re  co n v in c in g ly , D a r tm o u th  C o llege  h a d  c o n c e rn e d  th e  in v io ­
lab ility  o f  c o n tra c ts  m a d e  b y  s ta te s  as sovere ign  a u th o r itie s . U ta h  w as 
n o t  a  s ta te . U n d e r  its  en ab lin g  ac t, U ta h ’s te r r ito r ia l  leg is la tu re  a c te d  
su b jec t to  C o n g re ss ’s acqu iescence . C o n g ress  co u ld  n u llify  a n y  a c t  o f  
th e  te r r ito r ia l  leg is la tu re . T h u s , th e  c o u r t  co n c lu d e d , th e  c h a r te r  gave  
th e  C h u rc h  n o  vested  r ig h ts  b u t m ere ly  a llo w ed  it  to  exerc ise  th e  e n u ­
m e ra te d  p o w ers  “ d u r in g  th e  p lea su re  o f  C o n g re ss .” 190
A g a in s t th is , th e  M o rm o n s  ra ise d  a n  in g en io u s  a rg u m e n t. In  th e  
M o rr i ll  A c t  in  1862, o f  co u rse , C o n g ress  a n n u lle d  th e  C h u rc h ’s c h a r ­
te r; b u t, th e  M o rm o n s  a rg u e d , o n ly  in so fa r  as i t  fu r th e re d  o r  s u p ­
p o r te d  po ly g am y . B y im p lic a tio n , th e re fo re , C o n g ress  a p p ro v e d  o f  a ll 
p o r tio n s  o f  th e  C h u rc h ’s c h a r te r  th a t  d id  n o t  su p p o r t  p o ly g a m y .191 
T h e  c o u r t  re jec ted  th is  an a ly sis  a n d  h e ld  th a t  a n y  c o rp o ra te  p o w e rs  o f  
th e  C h u rc h  n o t n e g a te d  by  th e  M o rr i ll  A c t  w ere  nu llified  by  sec tio n  
17 o f  th e  E d m u n d s -T u c k e r  A c t .192
In  1889, a n  a p p e a l o f  th e  v a lid ity  o f  th e  E d m u n d s -T u c k e r  A c t’s 
p ro v is io n s  fo r d isso lv ing  th e  C h u rc h  a n d  se iz ing  its  p ro p e r ty  rea c h e d  
th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  S u p rem e  C o u r t .193 T h e  a rg u m e n ts  o f  th e  C h u rc h ’s 
a tto rn e y s  d isp lay ed  a  c le a r  p o litic a l rea lism . T h e y  m a d e  n o  a rg u ­
m e n ts  b ased  o n  th e  free  exerc ise  o f  re lig ion . In s te a d  th e  M o rm o n s  
a rg u e d  fo r  th e  sa n c tity  o f  c o n tra c t:  th e  C h u rc h ’s c h a r te r  w as a  c o n ­
t r a c t  th a t  C o n g ress  co u ld  n o t law fu lly  b re a k  by  rev o c a tio n . In  th e  
M o rr i ll  A c t  a n d  befo re , C o n g ress  im p lic itly  reco g n ized  th a t  c h a r te r . 
E v en  if  C o n g ress  w ere  a llo w ed  to  w ro n g fu lly  b re a k  th a t  c o n tra c t , n o  
p re c e d e n t o r  ra tio n a le  ex is ted  fo r se iz ing  th e  C h u rc h  p ro p e r ty . I n ­
s tead , i f  th e  c o rp o ra tio n  w ere  to  b e  d isso lved , its  p ro p e r ty  r ig h tfu lly  
re v e r te d  to  th e  C h u rc h ’s m e m b e rs h ip .194
T h e  C o u r t  re jec ted  e ach  p iece  o f  th e  a rg u m e n t in  tu rn . C o n ­
g ress’s p o w e r to  leg isla te  fo r th e  te r r ito r ie s  w as reaffirm ed . A lth o u g h  
th e  g ra n t  o f  p o w ers  to  th e  C h u rc h  w as law fu l w h e n  m a d e  by  th e  U ta h  
L e g is la tu re , it re m a in e d  so o n ly  as  lo n g  as  C o n g ress  acq u iesced . T h e  
p ro p e r ty  h e ld  b y  th e  C h u rc h  w as, o r  sh o u ld  h av e  been , d o n a te d  fo r
190 See Church o f Jesus Christ o f Latter-day Saints, 5 Utah at 371, 15 P. at 478.
191 Id. at 372-73, 15 P. at 478-79.
»92 5 Utah at 374-75, 15 P. at 479-81.
193 See The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
194 Id. at 10-11.
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p u b lic  a n d  c h a r i ta b le  p u rp o ses . In s te a d , th e  C h u rc h  em p lo y ed  it  to  
p ro m o te  p o ly g am y . B y d e p riv in g  th e  C h u rc h  o f  its  p ro p e r ty , th en , 
C o n g ress  d ire c te d  th a t  p ro p e r ty  to  its  p ro p e r  e n d  a n d  fu r th e re d  C o n ­
g ress’s po licy  o f  b lo ck in g  th e  sp re a d  o f  p o ly g a m y .195 A s legal p rec e ­
d e n t, th e  C o u r t  e la b o ra te ly  o u tlin e d  th e  a n c ie n t d o c tr in e  o f  c y  p r e s .  
U n d e r  th is  legal p r in c ip le , i f  a  c h a rita b le  t ru s t  c o u ld  n o t  be  fu lfilled  
ac c o rd in g  to  its  te rm s , th e  s ta te  w o u ld  ap p ly  th e  t ru s t  p ro p e r ty  to  
th o se  c h a r i ta b le  u ses th a t  m o s t n e a rly  a p p ro x im a te d  th e  o rig in a l p u r ­
po se  o f  th e  g r a n t .196 B y an a lo g y , th e  M o rm o n s ’ c o n tin u e d  u n law fu l 
a d h e re n c e  to  p o ly g am y  m a d e  a  r e tu rn  o f  C h u rc h  p ro p e r ty  to  th e  
m em b e rs  im p ro p e r. B ecause  th e  o rig in a l p u rp o se  o f  C h u rc h  d o n a ­
tio n s  c o u ld  n o t  b e  ac co m p lish e d  law fu lly , th e  p ro p e r ty  sh o u ld  th e n  be 
ap p lie d  to  o th e r  c h a rita b le  g o a ls .197
A lth o u g h  re jec ted , th e  M o rm o n s ’ a rg u m e n ts  w ere  n o t w ith o u t 
effect. T h e  C o u r t’s dec is io n  w as a  c lose  one , w ith  fo u r  ju s tic e s  d is ­
sen tin g . A c c e p tin g  th a t  C o n g ress  h a d  th e  p o w e r to  leg is la te  fo r  th e  
te r r ito r ie s , th e  d isse n te rs  a rg u e d  th a t  C o n g ress  “ is n o t a u th o r iz e d  
u n d e r  th e  co v e r o f  th a t  p o w e r to  seize a n d  co n fisca te  th e  p ro p e r ty  o f  
p e rso n s , in d iv id u a ls , o r  c o rp o ra tio n s , w ith o u t office fo u n d , becau se  
th e y  m ay  h av e  b een  g u ilty  o f  c rim in a l p ra c tic e s .” 198
R ec o g n iz in g  th a t  th e  o rig in a l d e c ree  m ig h t n eed  to  b e  m od ified  
s lig h tly , th e  S u p rem e  C o u r t  re m a n d e d  th e  case  to  th e  te r r ito r ia l  c o u r t  
fo r  fu r th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n . T h e  U ta h  S u p re m e  C o u r t  u n d e r to o k  to  d e ­
te rm in e  specifically  h o w  to  d isp o se  o f  th e  p ro p e r ty , b u t  b e fo re  th is  
issue  co u ld  be  reso lved , th e  C h u rc h  officially  ren o u n c e d  p o ly g am y  in  
O c to b e r  1890 .199 T h a t  a c tio n  c re a te d  a  p o w e rfu l c la im  fo r th e  c o u rts  
to  a b a n d o n  a  m ean in g le ss  effo rt to  seize C h u rc h  p ro p e r ty . H o w ev er, 
d esp ite  a  v ig o ro u s  d issen tin g  o p in io n , th e  U ta h  S u p re m e  C o u r t  re ­
fu sed  to  a b a n d o n  th e  fo rfe itu re  p ro ce e d in g s  a n d  c re a te d  a  t ru s te e  to  
a p p ly  C h u rc h  p ro p e r ty  “ to  th e  su p p o r t  a n d  a id  o f  th e  p o o r  o f  th e  
c h u rc h , a n d  to  th e  b u ild in g  a n d  re p a ir in g  o f  its  h o u se s  o f  w o rsh ip .” 200 
W ith  th e  ju d ic ia ry  u n a b le  a n d  u n w illin g  to  r e tu rn  m o s t C h u rc h  
p ro p e r ty , C o n g ress  fina lly  c lo sed  th e  b o o k  o n  fed e ra l e ffo rts to  d e s tro y  
th e  M o rm o n  relig ion . In  1893, U ta h ’s c o n g ress io n a l de leg a te , Jo se p h  
L . R a w lin s , in tro d u c e d  a  re so lu tio n  d ire c tin g  th e  r e tu rn  o f  th e  
C h u rc h ’s p e rso n a l p ro p e r ty . W ith  m in o r  a m e n d m e n ts  th e  re so lu tio n
>95 Id. at 43-50.
>96 Id. at 50-52, 67.
197 Id. at 64.
198 Id. at 67 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
199 See 6 B. Roberts, supra note 14, at 219-21.
200 United States v. The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. United States, 8 Utah 310, 31 P. 436 (1890).
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p a sse d  C ongress, a n d  on  J a n u a ry  10, 1894, w h a t w as left o f  th e  
C h u rc h ’s p e rso n a l p ro p e r ty  w as re tu rn e d . O n  Ju n e  8, 1896, th e  
C h u rc h ’s re a l e s ta te  w as re tu rn e d .201
In  th e  b a tt le  o f  w ills  b e tw een  th e  C h u rc h  a n d  th e  fed e ra l g o v e rn ­
m en t, th e  g o v e rn m e n t w as v ic to rio u s . I t  su p p re sse d  p o ly g am y  a n d  
c rip p le d  th e  C h u rc h ’s p o litica l, socia l, a n d  eco n o m ic  p o w e r in  th e  te r ­
r ito ry . F a c e d  w ith  a  ch o ice  b e tw een  a  p rin c ip le d  c o m m itm e n t to  p o ­
ly g am y  a n d  su rv iv a l as a n  o rg a n iz a tio n , th e  C h u rc h  ch o se  to  su rv ive .
V I. C o n c l u s io n
A  c e n tra l  fe a tu re  o f  th e  n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry  M o rm o n  ex p e rien ce  
w as its  c o n c e p t o f  Z io n , a  c o m m u n ity  o f  S a in ts  w h e re  G o d  a n d  H is  
p eo p le  c o u ld  dw ell to g e th e r  in  h a rm o n y . T h e  M o rm o n s  w ere  f ro m  
th e  b eg in n in g  a  g a th e re d  peop le . Id en tify in g  p o w erfu lly  w ith  a n c ie n t 
I s ra e l o f  th e  O ld  T e s ta m e n t, M o rm o n s  “ g a th e re d ”  first to  K ir tla n d , 
O h io ; la te r  to  Ja ck so n  C o u n ty , M isso u ri; a n d  th e n  to  N a u v o o , I l l i­
no is. T h e y  fina lly  fo u n d  s a n c tu a ry  in  th e  G re a t  B asin . P ro te c te d  by  
th e  R o c k y  M o u n ta in s , th e ir  soc ie ty  fo llow ed  a  u n iq u e  p a th  o f  dev e l­
o p m e n t u n til  th e  w o rld  c a u g h t u p  w ith  th e m  a n d  th e n  sw allow ed  a n d  
a ss im ila te d  th em .
T h e  c h a n g e d  re la tio n sh ip s  b e tw een  M o rm o n s  a n d  n o n -M o rm o n s  
s in ce  th e  tu rn  o f  th e  c e n tu ry  d e m o n s tra te  th a t  w ith  a ss im ila tio n  
co m es a  rev e rsa l o f  b e h a v io r  in  so m e  o f  th e  m em b e rs  o f  th e  c o m p e tin g  
co m m u n itie s . N o n -M o rm o n s  b ecam e  m o re  to le ra n t o f  M o rm o n  re li­
g ious beliefs a s  so o n  as M o rm o n s  re le g a te d  re lig io n  to  a  lim ited  
sp h e re  o f  b e lie f  a n d  c o n fo rm ed  to  m o re  tra d i tio n a l  c o n d u c t. 
M o rm o n s  cam e  to  a p p re c ia te  law y ers  a n d  th e  law , a lth o u g h  th e y  re ­
m a in e d  w a ry  o f  possib le  c o rru p tio n  in  each . P o litic a l a n d  soc ia l p lu ­
ra lism  ca m e  to  be  seen  as th e  flow ering  o f  th e  d o c tr in e  o f  free  agency . 
T h is  p a r t ic u la r  h is to ry , o f  c o u rse , ex p la in s  w h y  a  M o rm o n  c o m m u ­
n ity  to d a y  w ill exp ress, in  re lig io u s c o n c ep ts  a n d  te rm s, th o se  issues 
th a t  in  o th e r  c o m m u n itie s  a re  c o n s id e red  secu la r. T h e  d iv is ion  b e ­
tw een  c h u rc h  a n d  s ta te  is b a la n c e d  d iffe ren tly , in  fav o r o f  th e  c h u rc h , 
in  th e  M o rm o n  co m m u n ity . A  re c e n t a n d  in te n se  re lig io u sly  m o ti­
v a te d  c o lo n iz a tio n  w o u ld  h a rd ly  be  e x p ec ted  to  p ro d u c e  a  d iffe ren t 
s itu a tio n . B u t th e n , co lo n iz a tio n  o f  th e  W e st p ro d u c e d  th e  M o rm o n s ’ 
o w n  v ision  o f  soc ie ty— Z ion . T h is  a ssu re d  p ro fo u n d  effects o n  th e  
n a tu re  o f  th a t  so c ie ty  fa r  in to  its  fu tu re .
F o r  th e  M o rm o n  in  th e  tw e n tie th  c e n tu ry — in d eed , fo r  th e  re lig ­
io u sly  c o m m itte d  p e rso n  o f  a n y  tra d itio n — th e  q u e s tio n  s till re m a in s
201 See L. Arrington & D. Bitton, supra note 41, at 378.
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w h e th e r  in te n se  re lig io u s ex p e rien ce  c a n  b e  h a d  o u ts id e  c o m m u n ity . 
I f  th e  M o rm o n s  o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  w ere  r ig h t, th e n  in d ee d  th e  
p ilg r im ’s p a th  c o n tin u e s , se a rc h in g  w ith  St. P a u l a n d  S t. A u g u s tin e —  
a n d  w ith  Jo se p h  a n d  B rig h am — fo r th e  C ity  o f  G o d .
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